[KollelH blog] kiseyvas Sefer Torah

The Mitzvah To Write A Sefer Torah

In this week's parshah the Torah writes:  "V'atah kisvu lachem es ha'shirah ha'zos…" – And now, write for yourselves this song (Devarim 31:19). Rashi explains that the song that the pasuk is referring to is the parshah of Ha'azinu. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 21B derives from this pasuk that every Jew is commanded to write an entire Sefer Torah. However, if the pasuk is referring to parshas Ha'azinu, how can the Gemara take from here a commandment to write the entire Torah?

The Rambam in Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:1 explains that since the halacha is that when one is writing Torah one cannot write only one parshah, one must write the entire Torah. Many Achronim were bothered by obvious questions. Why is it permitted to write the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos without writing the entire Torah? Why is it that only regarding the mitzvah of writing the song of Ha'azinu are we required to write the entire Torah?

The Chasam Sofer, in his Shailos U'teshuvos (Yoreh De'ah 254), answers that the Beis Yosef (in Orach Chaim 49) says that the reason why one is prohibited from writing only a single parshah of the Torah is because we derive many halachos from the juxtaposition of the parshiyos of the Torah. If one would write only a single parshah, one would not be able to properly learn from such a script. When the Torah commanded us to write the shirah, the aforementioned pasuk in Devarim 31:19 continues, "…v'lamdah es Bnei Yisrael simah b'fihem…" – and teach it to the Bnei Yisrael, place it in their mouths. Since the purpose of the mitzvah of writing the shirah of Ha'azinu is for us to learn from it, it must be written together with the rest of the Torah. The parshiyos of tefillin and mezuzah are not intended for one to learn from; rather, those parshiyos remain concealed. Therefore, regarding those mitzvos, one is permitted to write a single parshah without writing the entire Torah.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, zt"l, suggests another answer to the above question. When one is writing the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos, the writing is not the same as when one generally writes Torah. The halacha that one may not write only one parshah only applies when one is writing Torah generally. When one is writing a parshah for tefillin or mezuzah, he is permitted to write a single parshah because he is not writing Torah for the sake of writing Torah. Rather he is writing for a specific purpose, namely tefillin and mezuzah. As opposed to when one is writing the parshah of Ha'azinu, there is no specific mitzvah that he is writing for. Instead it is considered regular writing of Torah, which is subject to the halacha of not writing Torah as single parshiyos.

The Shagas Aryeh in siman 34 asks another interesting question on the abovementioned Rambam. The Rambam said that since one cannot write Torah in single parshiyos, we must write the entire Torah. The Shagas Aryeh asks, "Does the reason that we cannot write single parshiyos so change the actual mitzvah that now the mitzvah is to write the entire Torah? Or does the mitzvah remain to only write the parshah of Ha'azinu, and one only must write the entire Torah so as not to transgress the prohibition of writing Torah as single parshiyos. One difference between these two options is that if one transgressed and wrote only the parshah of Ha'azinu, would he have fulfilled the mitzvah of kisvu … es ha'shirah ha'zos? Another difference is, if one had written the entire Torah and then everything except for parshas Ha'azinu became erased or torn. If the mitzvah remains to write only the parshah of Ha'azinu in these cases, one would have fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. If the Torah had intended for us to figure out, based on the prohibition to write single parshiyos, that the mitzvah is actually to write the entire Torah, one would have not fulfilled his obligation in these cases.

The Shagas Aryeh concludes that the Rambam's wording is indicative of his understanding that the actual mitzvah was to write the entire Torah. Additionally, the Sefer Hachinuch, from where he quotes the Rambam, only quotes that one is obligated to write the Torah in its entirety – and neglects to quote the reason why one cannot write single parshiyos. This would indicate that the Chinuch understood that the Rambam was of the opinion that the prohibition to write single parshiyos was merely an indication for us to understand that the mitzvah was not to write parshas Ha'azinu alone; rather we are to write the Torah in its entirety. Therefore the Chinuch did not deem it necessary to inform us how we know that the mitzvah includes the entire Torah, since it is not part of the actual mitzvah. As a result, according to the Rambam, if one wrote only parshas Ha'azinu, or only parshas Ha'azinu remained from the entire Torah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation in this mitzvah.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 9/21/2011 11:16:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Ki Savo - Arvus: Does It Apply to Women

In parshas ki savo we read that Moshe divided the Binai Yisroel to receive brachos and klalos. He set six tribes on Har Grizim and six tribes on Har Aival, with the Kohanim, Leviyim, and the Aron in the valley. He told the Kohanim and leviyim to turn towards har Grizim and recite a blessing (i.e. Blessed is the man who does not make an idol…) and everyone should answer "Amen". Then the Kohanim and Leviyim would turn towards har Aival and recite a klala (such as Accursed is the man who makes an idol…) and everyone would say "Amen". The Gemarah in Sota 37b derives from this parsha the concept of arvus (responsibility)- that each member of klal Yisroel is responsible for the other members' obligations.

One common application of the concept of arvus is found in the Gemarah in Rosh Hashana 29a. Generally one can only perform a mitzvah and make a bracha on it when he is obligated in it. Once he fulfills his obligation in the mitzvah he can no longer recite a bracha over its performance since he is no longer obligated in it. The Gemarah says that one can perform a mitzvah and recite a bracha on behalf of another person and fulfill his obligation in the mitzvah for them even though he has already fulfilled his own obligation. Rashi explains that this is because all of Klal Yisroel are araivim one to each other regarding their obligation in mitzvos. The Ran there adds that since we are all araivim for each other, even though one person has already performed his mitzvah, as long as another person has not yet fulfilled his mitzvah it is considered as if the first one has not yet completely fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. Therefore he can perform the mitzvah with on his friend's behalf even with a bracha.

The Gemarah in Brachos 20b discusses whether a woman is obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa (from the Torah) or only midrabanan (from the Rabanan). The Gemarah says that if she is only obligated midrabanan she cannot recite brchas hamazon for a man who is obligated midoraisa. The R'Osh explains that this is because women are not included in arvus with men. There is a machlokes regarding the correct intent of this R'Osh.

The Dagol Mirvavah (written by the Nodeh B'Yehuda) takes the R'Osh literally; that women are not included in arvus with men. Rabbi Akiva Aiger understands that the R'Osh was only referring to the mitzvah of birchas hamazon. The R'Osh was discussing the opinion that said that women were not obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa. According to that opinion the R'Osh explained that women would not be included in the arvus with men who were obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa and thus would not be able to recite it on their behalf. However regarding all other mitzvos that women are obligated in, they would be included in the arvus with men.

One application of this machlokes is regarding Kiddush on Friday night. Once one has davened ma'ariv he has already fulfilled his obligation of kiddush midoraisa, since he mentioned 'mikadesh hashabbos' in his davening. However he is still obligated to recite kiddush again over a cup of wine midrabanan. Women are obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midoraisa. When a man comes home Friday night after davening he is no longer obligated in the mitzvah of Kiddush midoraisah. His wife on the other hand (if she has not davened) is obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midioraisa. The Dagol Mirvava says that in the view of the R'Osh, the husband would not be able to be motzi his wife in kiddish since she is not in arvus with him. Only if he had not davened, and thus was still obligated in the mitzvah midoraisa would he be able to be motzi her without arvus since he is obligated in the mitzvah on his own.

Rabbi Akiva Aiger argues that regarding the mitzvah of kiddush men and women are both included in arvus and therefore even if a man has already fulfilled his obligation he can still recite kiddish on behalf of a woman who is obligated midoraisa.

Additionally Rabbi Akiva Aiger points out that if the woman would merely say "Gut Shabbos" she would have fulfilled her obligation of kiddush midoraisa as well. Therefore even according to the Dagol Mirvava that they are not included in arvus together, after she says gut Shabbos, a man would be able to recite kiddish on her behalf.

{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 9/19/2011 11:47:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Eikev -

The Gemarah in Minachos 43b cites a Braisah that says: Reb Meir says one is obligated to make 100 brachos daily as it says in this week's parsha (10:12) Ma Hashem Elokecha shoel ma'imcha. Rashi on the Gemarah explains that we read the word "ma" as "meah" which means 100; so that the passuk reads as follows: "One hundred (daily brachos) is all that Hashem asks of you". Tosafos explains that we derive this obligation from the fact that there are 100 letters in this passuk when you read the word "ma" as "meah" (with the additional aleph). The BaHaG goes so far as to count this obligation amongst his count of 613 mitzvos!

Generally we assume that this obligation is upon each person to recite 100 brachos throughout his day. However it appears that some Rishonim understand that this is not merely an obligation on the individual, rather the mitzvah was intended for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom (daily order) in which the avodas hayom constitutes 100 brachos.

We find this concept in the Kol Bo siman 8. The Rambam says that maariv is a rishus (optional). The Kol Bo asks how can it be optional when the 24 brachos contained in maariv (5 of shima and 19 of shimoneh esray) are part of the count of the 100 brachos? The Kol Bo argues that maariv is not optional rather the meaning of "r'shus" is that one has the option to recite shimoneh esray before shkiya (sunset).

The Kol Bo's question on the Rambam can only be understood if we explain that his view of the meah brachos was meant for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom of brachos. Then he can ask how could maariv be optional leaving a deficit in the seder of 100 brachos.

With this explanation we can understand why the Gemarah in Minachos felt the need to calculate where one should make up the missing brachos on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when the shimoneh essray is shorter. The gemarah instructs that one should smell good spices and eat sweets and recite their brachos. Why does the Gemarah need to find solutions for us? Couldn't we have figured out how to total 100 brachos on our own?

However, according to our understanding of the Kol Bo, we can assume that the Gemarah is establishing the brachos of smelling spices and tasting treats as the seder hayom for Shabbos and Yom Tov!

With this we can also understand the p'sak of the Sh'lah (maseches Yoma) that on Yom Kippor there is no obligation to recite 100 brachos. If the obligation to recite 100 brachos was on the individual, then why should his individual duty be different on Yom Kippor? Even if one cannot eat or drink, he should find other ways to ensure that he recites 100 brachos! However if the halacha was for the Rabanan to establish an avodas hayom of 100 brachos, then we can understand that  Yom Kippor may have different seder hayom.

Taking this a step further, perhaps we can say that according to the Kol Bo and Sh'lah, women may be exempt from this obligation. Since women are not obligated in various different brachos of the general seder hayom (such as tallis, tiffilin, maariv, and krias shima) the avodas hayom of meah brachos may not pertain to them.

With this we can answer a question that is asked regarding the origin of the halacha to recite 100 brachos. The Medrash in Bamidbar Raba (18 :21)and the Tur Orach Chaim (siman 46) say that in Dovid Hamelech's time every day 100 people would die and no one knew why. As a result Dovid Hamelech instituted that everyone must recite 100 brachos daily. There seems to be in contradictionwith the Gemarah in Minachos says that Reb Meir derived this mitzvah from a passuk without any mention of Dovid Hamelech.
With approach above, I want to suggest that Dovid Hamelech made an obligation on the individual to recite 100 brachos every day. One could choose to make whichever brachos he would please. The halacha mentioned in the Gemarah in the name of Reb Meir is the obligation on the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom by which one should follow and recite the specific 100 brachos.

Enjoy the seder hayom of Shabbos! {R.F.}

For questions or comments on this dvar torah email rabbirfuchs@gmail.com

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 8/18/2011 11:53:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Mass'ei - Yishuv Eretz Yisrael

In this week's parsha we learn the mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisroel. The passuk says vihorashtem es haaretz viyishavtem bah - you shall possess the Land and settle in it (33:53). The Ramban in his commentary on chumash explains that here the Torah is commanding us in a mitzvas assay to inherit and dwell in Eretz Yisroel. Similarly the Ramban counts this mitzvah in his count of mitzvos assay (number 4 of the mitzvos that the Rambam did not count).

There is an interesting discussion about the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel regarding where and when it can apply.

There are two unique aspects of Eretz Yisroel. One is that it is intrinsically holy. The second is that there are several mitzvos that only apply in Eretz Yisroel. For example terumah, maaser, and most other mitzvos pertaining to things that grow on the ground. The holiness of Eretz Yisroel exists as result of the promise that Hashem made to the Avos that He would give their children Eretz Yisroel. The mitzvos which are unique to Eretz Yisroel only apply when b'nai yisroel conquer the land. Even if they conquer a land that was not part of the originally 'Promised' Land, it will become obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel such as terumah and maser.

The intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel obligates us in a different manner. The Gemarah at the end of Kesubos (110b) discusses various halachos pertaining to Eretz Yisroel and the benefits of living there. For example, one may not leave Eretz Yisroel except under certain circumstances. Also, a husband or wife that desires to live in Eretz Yisroel can force their spouse to move to Eretz Yisroel. The benefits may apply to one who lives in Eretz Yisroel and even to one who is just buried there. The Gemarah informs us that one who lives in Eretz Yisroel has his avairos forgiven, and the Gemarah further relates how the Amoraim would kiss the stones of Eretz Yisroel, and roll in its dirt.

These halachos and benefits result from the intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel due to the promise made to the Avos.

Since these two aspects of Eretz Yisroel are brought about by different causes, they can be mutually exclusive. There can be a place that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel without the mitzvos normally associated with Eretz Yisroel. Similarly there can be a place is that is obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel while it does not possess the intrinsic holiness of other areas in Eretz Yisroel.

The Gemarah in Gittin 8b discusses the status of a land that a king of Yisroel conquers in an improper maner , for example according to Rashi if the king conquered the land for his own purposes not for the general public. The Mahari Korkus (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:2) explains that the discussion in the Gemarah concerning the status of such land is only with regards to the mitzvos that are applicable in Eretz Yisroel, however if part of the promised land is conquered in an improper manner it nevertheless remains holy. Therefore if a king improperly conquered a part of Eretz Yisroel which was promised to the Avos, it would not be obligated in mitzvos associated with Eretz Yisroel. However it would retain its holiness and the halachos & benefits pertaining to living in Eretz Yisroel would still be applicable.

The Radvaz (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:4) says that any land outside the borders of the original promise, (even if it was conquered properly) will only be considered Eretz Yisroel regarding mitzvos, however it will not receive the holiness of Eretz Yisroel.

It is unclear whether the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel is applicable only when the other mitzvos are applicable, or if it is dependent on the holiness of Eretz Yisroel regardless if it obligated in other mitzvos. The Gemarah in Gittin 8b says that one may transgress the rabanan prohibition of amirah l'akum on shabbos (ordering a goi to do a melacha) and order a goi to write a document for the acquiring a house in Suria because of mitzvas yishuv Eretz Yisroel. This is a clear indication that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel applies even to land outside of the land promised to the Avos, since Suria was not part of the Promised Land.

The Gemarah in Yevamos 64a says that Avraham Avinu fulfilled the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel. Clearly the b'nai yisroel had not conquered Eretz Yisroel at that time. This indicates that although the land had only the holiness set forth by the promise to the Avos one is obligated in the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel.

We can conclude that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel seemingly applies both to a land that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel, and to a land that only has the obligations of the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel.

May we all be zocheh... B'Karov. {R.F.}

For questtions or comments please email RabbiRfuchs@gmail.com

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/29/2011 01:27:00 AM

[KollelH blog] Pinchas - Kana'us and Kehunah

This week's parsha begins with the reward that Pinchas received for killing Zimri. Hashem gave Pinchas a bris of shalom and of kehuna that he and his descendents would be kohanim.

The Gimorah in Zivachim 101b brings a machlokes as to whether Pinchas was a kohen from before this episode or not. According to one opinion although Aharon and his sons had already become kohanim, until this episode Pinchas was not a kohen even though he was a grandson to Aharon Hakohen because kehunah was only given to Aharon and his sons and all future generations from then on; excluding those that were already born. According to the opinion that Pinchas was not a kohen prior to this episode we understand that this is when he did become a kohen. However according to the opinion that he was already a kohen why does the Torah say that he was made a kohen in reward for his act of killing Zimri?

The Moshav Zikainim L'balai HaTosafos offers an answer to this question. They say that although Pinchas was a kohen prior to this act he actually lost his kehunah through this act of killing Zimri. As the Gimorah in Birachos 32b says that a kohen who kills is passul (unfit) to duchen. Therefore when Pinchas killed Zimri he became passul for kehunah, creating the necessity for a new kehunah.

The Moshav Zikainim adds that Reb Yichiel of Paris fundamentally disagreed with this answer. Reb Yichiel said that Pinchas did not lose his kehunah when he killed Zimri since the halacha is that a kanoi (a zealot) can kill someone who does an avaira with a goi in public, the one performing the avaira is considered a gavra kitaila (a dead man). A kohen who kills a gavra kitaila does not lose his kehunah. Since the man is already considered dead it is not considered as if the kohen killed him. (The Moshav Zikainim does not quote how Reb Yichiel answers the original question of why was it necessary to make Pinchas a kohen since he already was a kohen.)

It seems that the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel argue about the nature of the right of the kanoi to kill the one performing the avaira. The Balai Tosafos are of the opinion that when the kanoi kills the one performing the avaira it is considered retzichah (murder) and therefore if he was a kohen he would lose his kehunah. Reb Yichiel is of the opinion that it is not considered retzichah when a kanoi kills the one performing the avaira since he is considered dead already.

Perhaps we can say that the underlying machlokes is whether the one performing the avaira is chaiv misa (has a judgment punishable with death) except that instead of bais din killing him the Torah appointed all kanoim to carry out the judgment, or there is no chiyuv misa on him, rather the Torah allowed kanoim to murder under such circumstances. The Balai Tosafos that say that it is considered murder when a kanoi kills, support the notion that there is no judgment of death against the one performing the avaira, therefore it is considered murder. Reb Yichiel who said that it is not considered murder would support the idea that there is a chiyuv misa against the one performing the avaira, therefore he is considered a gavra kitaila (dead man).

Besides for the difference of whether a kohen will become unfit for the avoda if he kills one doing such an avaira, there is another difference between the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel. The halacha is that if one does something for which he will be deserving misa (the death penalty) and and the same time he also became obligated in a monetary debt, he is exempt from the monetary obligation. This is known as kim lay bidiraba minay. There is a question as to whether or not we can apply this rule to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, as a kanoi can kill him. Reb Akiva Aiger in Kisubos 29a is of the opinion that we do apply kim lay bidiraba minay to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, and he will be exempt from any monetary obligations that occur during the avaira.

Apparently Reb Akiva Aiger agrees with Reb Yichiel that there is a chiyuv misa on such a man. Whereas according to the Balai Tosafos that said that there is no judgment of death against one who does an avaira with a goi in public, rather the Torah granted permission to kanoim to kill them, we would not apply the rule of kim lay bidiraba minai in this case and he would be obligated to pay for any monetary obligations that occur during the performance of the avaira.

{R.F.}

For questions and comments please email rabbiRFuchs@gmail.com

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/15/2011 12:19:00 AM

[KollelH blog] BALAK - Was Pinchas A Rodef?

At the conclusion of the parsha we learn of the episode involving Pinchas when he zealously avenged Hashem's vengeance from upon the b'nai yisroel. Zimri, who was the nassi of shevet Shimon (or only of a bais av), had performed an avaira with a Midianite woman in public. The halacha states that in such circumstances a kanoi (zealot) can kill the one doing the avaira, in an effort to avenge Hashem's vengeance. If one is not a kanoi or he is not acting to avenge Hashem's vengeance he may not kill the one performing the avaira. In addition, a kanoi may only kill the transgressor while he is performing the avaira. Once thed sinner is no longer engaged in the avaira, he may not be killed even by a kanoi. The Torah testifies that Pinchas was indeed acting to avenge Hashem's vengeance when he killed Zimri.

The Gimora in Sanhedrin 82 says that although Pinchas had the right to kill Zimri he nonetheless was considered a rodef (one who is pursuing another with intention to kill him). Since the halacha is that everyone can kill a rodef, had Zimri prompted and killed Pinchas instead he would not have been penalized for murder.

The sefer Kli Chemda (parshas Balak ; 4) asks the following question: the Gemara in Sanhedrin 74 says that although everyone may kill a rodef, if it is possible to save the one being chased without killing the rodef one may not kill the rodef. For example if one can injure the rodef (and that would suffice in preventing him from killing the pursuant) he must do so, and may not kill the rodef. In the case of Pinchas and Zimri, Pinchas was the rodef and Zimri was the being pursued. The Gemara says that Zimri the sinner, was allowed to kill Pinchas, as Pinchas himself was a rodef. However there should have been a clear alternative to killing that would have been sufficient to prevent Pinchas from killing the pursuant- if Zimri would stop performing the avaira, then Pinchas would have ceased pursuing Zimri! Why does the Gemara say that Zimri could have killed Pinchas when there was a way to prevent the pursuit without spilling blood?

The Kli Chemda is assuming that when the Gemara said that Pinchas assumed the status of a rodef the Gemara's intention was to equate him to all other rodfim. However we do find that there is a difference between the status of rodef that Pinchas attained and that of a regular rodef. The M'eri in Sanhadrin 82 says that no one aside from Zimri was allowed to kill Pinchas. With regard to a regular rodef , anyone who can prevent the murder must do so even if they must take the life of the rodef. Clearly the M'eri understood that the status rodef that Pinchas attained was different than that of a regular rodef.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro zt"l explains the difference between Pinchas and a regular rodef as follows: Pinchas was called a rodef even though Zimri was doing an avaira that he should be killed for because there is no obligation in bais din to kill him. The Torah granted permission to any kanoi to kill anyone who performs such acts. However the kanoi is acting outside of bais din and there is no judgment of death against the person. Although he has permission from the Torah to kill, bais din must view him as someone pursuing to kill another innocent man. Therefore when a kanoi pursues a perpetrator he will attain a status of a rodef.

However there is a difference between a rodef after an actual innocent man and a rodef after a man whom he has permission to kill. The reason that everyone may kill a rodef who is chasing an innocent man, is in order to save the victim's life. The Torah therefore puts the victim's life before the rodef's and so anyone may protect the victim by killing the rodef. In the case of Pinchas and Zimri, the victim was Zimri. The Torah would not allow anyone to kill Pinchas in order to save Zimri, for Zimri was punishable by death. However the Torah still allows the one doing the avaira to kill the kanoi as a means of self defense.

The halacha that if one can prevent the rodef from killing the victim without killing the rodef then he must take those measures, only applies to a regular rodef where the purpose of killing the rodef is to save the victim. When we are looking to save a victim we also must try to save the rodef if possible. Whereas by a kanoi who is chasing one doing this avaira, the one doing the avaira does not need to take precautionary measures not to kill his rodef since the reason he is allowed to kill him is not in order to save the victim.


{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/08/2011 12:43:00 AM

[KollelH blog] Chukas - Why A Dead Person Is Mitamai

In this week's parsha we learn that when a person dies he is mitamai. There is a machlokes regarding the reason for this tumah. The Ramban in the beginning of this week's parsha explains that when a person dies by means of the malach hamaves (angel of death) he is mitamai. However if one dies by means of nishika (a form of death performed by Hashem and not the malach hamaves) he will not be mitamai. It is for this reason that chazal said that tzadikim do not become tamai in their death, since presumably they died by means of nisheka. The Avnai Nezer (yorah deah 466) adds that Reb Chaim Vital says that the malach hamaves sprinkles three 'bitter drops' on a person when he comes to kill him, and those 'drops' are what create the tumah.

The Or Hachaim has a different understanding of why a dead person becomes tamai. He explains that since we accepted the Torah every Jew is on a high level of kidusha. All of the forces of tumah are constantly anticipating and eagerly awaiting a chance to cling to the kidusha. As soon as a person dies the forces of tumah are able to enter the body and thus the person is tamai. He explains that it is for this reason that goy does not become tamai when he dies; since in his life he was desolate of kidusha the forces of tumah are not interested in entering the body. The Or Hachaim explains that with this understanding we can answer the question of the wording of the passuk "Zos chukkas haTorah", why does the Torah refer to the mitzvah of tumah as the chok of the Torah. Since tumah only sets in as a result of being on a high spiritual level and the Torah is the means by which b'nai yisroel were elevated to the higher level of kidusha, the Torah refers to this mitzvah as the chok of the Torah. The Avnai Nezer cites a Zohar that seems to be in accordance with the reason given by the Or Hachaim.

The Avnai Nezer, cited above, says that there is a halachic difference between the opinion of the Ramban and Reb Chaim Vital, and the opinion of the Or Hachaim. The Zohar says that only one who dies naturally is killed by the malach hamaves, all those who are killed by others are not killed by the malach hamaves. Based on this, according to the Ramban who said that tumah only sets in when the malach hamaves kills, when one is killed by another he should not be tamai.

It is unclear if kivrai tzadikim (graves of tzadikim) are mitamai or not and whether a kohen can visit such places. According to the opinion of the Ramban who said that a dead person is only mitamai when the malach hamaves kills him, tzadikim may be mitamai when they die. Since the Gimorah in Moed Katan says that there were many tzadikim who died by means of the malach hamaves and not nisheka.

On the other hand according to the Or Hachaim who said that a dead person is mitamai as a result of the forces of tumah attempting to attach to the kidusha, perhaps when a tzadik dies he will not be mitamai. While a person is alive the forces of tumah cannot set in because the kiddusha is present and does not allow the tumah in. after he dies the tumah can now enter. However regarding a tzadik even his body becomes kaddosh and remains kadosh even after his death. Therefore the forces of tumah cannot enter even after he dies, for kisusha still remains.

Tosafos in Baba Mitzeya 114b cites a Medrash Yalkut in Mishlei that says that Eliyahu Hanavi and Reb Yehoshua (a talmid of Rebi Akiva) were burying Rebi Akiva. Reb Yihoshua asked Eliyahu Hanavi how is it that you can burry a dead person when you are indeed a kohen? Eliyahu Hanavi answered that talmidai chachamim and their talmidim are not mitamai. Tosafos says that Eliyahu Hanavi only answered what he said out of respect for Rebi Akiva, because the actual reason that Eliyahu Hanavi was allowed to burry Rebi Akiva was since Rebi Akiva was put to death by the malchus, no one would dare bury him. Therefore he had the status of a mais mitzvah for which a kohen is allowed to be mitamai. Apparently Tosafos holds that we paskin that tzadikim are mitamai.

The Gemarah in Baba Basra 58a says that Reb Binuh was setting markings of graves so no one would be mitamai. The Gemarah says that he went to miaras hamachpela to mark where the graves actually were. Some want to use this as a source that tzadikim are mitamai, since their graves had to be marked. However the Minchas Elazar (3:64) says that we cannot deduce anything from this Gemarah. Because the Gemarah in Sota 13 says that Chushim the son of Dun decapitated Esav and his head rolled into Miaras Hamachpela and was buried there. Since Esav was a Jew as the Gemoarah in Kiddushin 18a says, therefore he would be mitamai and it was for him that Reb Binuh felt necessary to mark Miaras Hamachpela.

{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/01/2011 01:15:00 AM

[KollelH blog] Korach

In this week's parsha we learn of the rebellion of Korach. At the end of the first pasuk Rashi tells us that Korach and his assembly, in an effort to undermine Moshe Rabainu's authority, came before Moshe Rabbenu wearing garments that were comprised completely of t'cheiles and asked "Is a talis that is made completely of t'cheiles obligated to have t'cheiles in the tzitzis as well or not?" Moshe answered them that it is indeed obligated. The assembly started laughing at Moshe, and argued that if a talis of a different material only requires one string of t'cheiles for it to be exempt from its obligation of t'cheiles, certainly a garment that is made of t'cheiles should exempt itself. The Medrash Hagadol informs us of the rest of the dialog between Moshe and Korach and his assembly. The Medrash says that Moshe answered Korach with the following question: is a house full of seforim obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah or not?" Korach answered that it is obligated. To which Moshe responded that just as a house full of seforim is obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah so too a garment comprised only of t'cheiles is still obligated in the mitzvah of t'cheiles in the tzitis.

There are several points in the exchange between Moshe and Korach that are perplexing. Why did Korach only ask that a garment which is completely comprised of t'cheiles should be exempt from its obligation of t'cheiles? Why didn't he ask that a garment that is completely white should exempt itself from the obligation to put white strings on the garment? Another question is, the mitzvah of t'cheiles is to attatch a string of t'cheiles to a garment, how can Korach suggest that one fulfill his obligation in any other fashion? Also why did Korach use the terminology of a garment becoming exempt from its obligation, the focus should have been on the person- has he fulfilled the mitzvah with such a garment or not.

The Kesef Mishnah in hilchos Teffilin (1:11) cites a Rambam in teshuvos that explains that with regard to the mitzvah of mezuzah the mezuzah is not the mitzvah, rather the house is obligated to have a mezuzah on it. When there is no house there is no obligation of mezuzah. Obviously there is no obligation on the house for it is inanimate; however the Rambam means the person is obligated to ensure that his house has a mezuzah. Therefore the house is what obligates one to put up the mezuzah.

When one puts a mezuzah on his house he has exempt his house from obligating him in the mitzvah of mezuzah. Similarly, a four cornered garment obligates anyone who wears it to put on a string of t'cheiles. When one attaches a string of ticheles to the garment he has exempt the garment from obligating him in t'cheiles, hence the terminology of exempt applies to a garment and a house.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro zt"l explains that it appears from the Rambam (hilchos tzitis 1:3) that there is a difference between the mitzvah of white strings and the t'cheiles string.

The Rambam writes that there are two parts to the mitzvah of tzitis, the corners should have white strings coming out of them and that you should attach a string of t'cheiles to the corner. Seemingly the mitzvah of the white strings is that the garment should have white stings coming out of its corners. The mitzvah of the white strings is a mitzvah in the garment. We could say the mitzvah of the white strings is to wear a talis mitzuyetzes "a garment with white strings". On the other hand the mitzvah of t'cheiles is not to wear a "garment with a string of ticheles"; rather the mitzvah is to attach a string of t'cheiles to the garment. The garment is not part of the mitzvah of t'cheiles.

Obviously Korach would not ask that one should be able to perform a mitzvah not in its proper maner. However he understood that the nature of the obligation to attach a t'cheiles string was different than that of the white strings. Korach never thought to exempt a white garment from the obligation to attach white strings to it because the garment itself requires white strings to come out of its corners. Therefore even with an all white garment there still is a requirement of the garment to have white strings come out of it. He only thought that a garment of ticheles could exempt one from his obligation to attach a string of ticheles since the mitzvah of t'cheiles is separate from the mitzvah of the garment. Korach understood that the nature of the mitzvah of t'cheiles was merely to attach a string of t'cheiles and not an integral part of the garment, as were the white strings. Therefore Korach reasoned that if the garment already contains t'cheiles it should not require any other t'cheiles attachments.

{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/24/2011 08:57:00 AM

[KollelH blog] Shlach - Tzitzis and Shatnez

At the conclusion of this week's parsha the Torah commands us in the mitzvah of tzitzis. The Gimorah in Yivamos 4a learns from a drasha that one may wear shatnez (wool and linen) in his tzitzis, and that this is the source in the Torah that asay is doche losasay- the asay of tzitzis allows one to transgress the losasay of shatnez.



The Bris Avraham asks a question on the Gimorah based on the following two notions: first the Gimorah in Yivamos 4b says the Torah only prohibited shatnez when the one wearing the shatnez derives a physical benefit from the garment. Second, the opinion of the Rashba in Niddarim 15a is that the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu (mitzvos were not given for pleasure purposes) dictates that any physical benefit derived from the performance of a mitzvah is not considered pleasure. Based on these premises the Bris Avraham suggests that while wearing tzitzis one will not be deriving benefit from the garment. Therefore even if the garment contains shatnez one would not be prohibited from wearing it since one is only prohibited to wear shatnez when he derives benefit from the garment. How can the Gimorah learn that asay is doche a losasay from the fact that tzitzis can be worn with shatnez, if when one wears tzitzis with shatnez there is no prohibition of shatnez at all?



The Bris Avraham answers that we only apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu if one could not perform the mitzvah in any other manner other than by trangresing the avaira. In the case of tzitzis one is not required to wear a linen garment creating a situation of shatnez. Therefore when the Torah says that we may wear linen garments with wool strings, it is not as a result of the general rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu since there is a way to perform the mitzvah without transgressing any prohibitions- a wool garment with wool strings.



The Imrai Bina (hilchos tzitzis 3) offers another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham. Mitzvos can be categorized in two groups: mitzvos in which physical pleasure is an integral part of the mitzvah for example eating, and mitzvos whose essence is unrelated to receiving any pleasure for example Tiffilin. The Rashba that we cited earlier that is of the opinion that any pleasure derived while performing a mitzvah is allowed even if it would otherwise be forbidden, only applies to the mitzvos that the pleasure is not an integral part of the mitzvah. If one derives pleasure from such a mitzvah we say he is not doing the action for the sake of the pleasure rather for the sake of the mitzvah and is therefore permitted. Whereas if the mitzvah itself requires one to receive pleasure we will not allow one to receive that pleasure from a forbidden source for he is in fact acting for the sake of the pleasure. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis for it is a mitzvah that requires one to receive pleasure, namely the warmth of the garment.



We find this concept from the Rishon Reb Avraham Min Hahar in Niddarim 48. The Mishna says that one can prohibit one to learn Torah from his sefer by making a nedder. Reb Avraham Min Hahar asks how can one forbid one to learn Torah? Since learning Torah is a mitzvah we should apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu. He answers that we only say mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu regarding mitzvos that are primarily action based, therefore when there is any pleasure derived we can disqualify it since that is not the reason for the action. However the mitzvah of learning Torah is primarily and essentially for the sake of pleasure and enjoyment. It for that reason that an uvel (morner) is forbidden to learn Torah, as the passuk states pikudai Hashem yisharim misamchai lev. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of learning Torah since we cannot say that one is not acting for the sake of pleasure, for by this mitzvah one indeed is seeking the pleasure that accompanies the mitzvah.



I want to suggest another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham of how can we learn from the allowance of shatnez in tzitzis that asay is doche a losasay if by tzitzis there is no prohibition of shatnez since one is not deriving benefit from the garment according to the Rashba. I think that when the Rashba said that any pleasure derived from a mitzvah is not considered pleasure it was only to say that the forbidden pleasure would be permitted if derived from a mitzvah. However the Rashba would agree that there is a physical pleasure that is derived, only that it is not forbidden under theses circumstances. Therefore with regards to shatnez we only require one to derive benefit from the garment in order for it to be considered that he is wearing the garment containing shatnez. If one is not deriving benefit from a garment he is not considered wearing it. The actual pleasure is not prohibited; rather it is a precondition in wearing the garment. Although the pleasure derived while performing the mitzvah of tzitzis will be permitted it is nonetheless a pleasure and should be sufficient to consider the garment worn. Therefore even if we apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis there would still be a necessity for asay doche losasay.


{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/17/2011 02:14:00 PM

Challenges given to us by G-D have the perfect risk/gain ratio for our growth in life.