[KollelH blog] Toldos

How Did Yitzchak Eat From Eisav's Shechitah?

In this week's parshah we read about the berachos that Yitzchak had intended to give Eisav, but instead (unintentionally) gave to Yaakov Avinu. Yaakov was able to receive the berachos instead of Eisav because Yitzchak had requested Eisav to go out to the field and hunt game for him. This provided Yaakov sufficient time to prepare everything in order for him to receive the berachos. When Yitzchak requested of Eisav that he hunt game for him, he told him to "…sa na keilecha telyecha vekashtecha – sharpen your gear, your sword, and your bow" (Bereishis 27:3). Rashi explains that Yitzchak was telling Eisav to sharpen his knife so that he would shecht (slaughter) properly; thus the food would not be a neveilah. The Sifsei Chachamim explains that by sharpening his knife he would ensure that there were not any nicks on the knife. Regarding this pasuk, the ba'alei Tosafos and the Rush add that the word in the pasuk, "tzayid," is written with the letter "hay" although it is not pronounced. This is to inform us that Yitzchak taught Eisav the five (the numerical value of the letter "hay") halachos of shechitah that can disqualify a shechitah.

The Chasam Sofer (She'eilos V'teshuvos, Yoreh De'ah 15) asks the following question regarding Yitzchak's request to Eisav: Why did Yitzchak have to tell Eisav to sharpen his knife now? For if Yitzchak was indeed concerned that Eisav would otherwise not have sharpened his knife, how could he trust him now? And if Yitzchak felt confident that Eisav would generally check his knife, why was he compelled to remind him now? Similarly, one could ask why Yitzchak would now teach Eisav about hilchos shechitah. Shouldn't he have taught him many years earlier, as Eisav was already 63 years old at the time of the berachos? Additionally, the ba'alei Tosafos ask another question on this episode. The Gemara in Chullin 5a says that a mumar (heretic) is unfit to shecht. How then could Yitzchak have eaten from Eisav's shechitah, since the Gemara in Kiddushin 18a says that Eisav was a mumar?

            As a result of this and other questions, the Chasam Sofer disagrees with the Sifsei Chachamim, saying that Yitzchak told Eisav to sharpen his blade for a different reason other than to ensure that it did not contain nicks. He explains that the purpose of telling Eisav to sharpen his knife was to remove the fat that was remaining on the knife from the avodah zarah foods that Eisav's wives would serve. Generally this would not have prohibited the meat if it was rinsed, but since Yitzchak had asked for tzeli (roasted meat), as it was a korban Pesach, the meat would otherwise be prohibited unless the knife was cleaned via sharpening.

            I would like to suggest the following solution to explain the opinion of the Sifsei Chachamim: The Gemara in Chullin 4a says that there are two types of mumars: a mumar leteiavon – one who sins out of temptation – and a mumar lehachis – one who sins without temptation but solely to spite Hashem. The halacha that a mumar is disqualified from shechting only applies to a mumar lehachis. A mumar leteiavon may shecht, provided that a trustworthy person checks his knife. In order to shecht properly there must not be any nicks on the blade of the knife. If there is, the shechitah is invalid. Therefore one must carefully check the blade prior to shechting, to ensure that there are no nicks on the blade. Since the process of checking the blade is burdensome, we may not rely on a mumar leteiavon exerting himself and checking his knife properly. Thus if a mumar leteiavon shechts without anyone checking his blade for him, the shechitah is invalid – for we assume that he did not properly check his blade and there may have been a nick on it. However, if someone else checks the blade, a mumar leteiavon may shecht.

The Gemara in Kiddushin that refers to Eisav as a mumar does not specify which type of mumar he was. I suggest that perhaps Eisav was considered a mumar leteiavon, and not a mumer lehachis. Therefore, if someone else would check his knife for him, he would be allowed to shecht. Yitzchak knew that Eisav was outstanding in the mitzvah of kibud av (honoring one's father) and he was certain that Eisav would fulfill any of his requests. As a result, Yitzchak told Eisav now to sharpen his knife in order to be certain that he would check the blade. Yitzchak felt that the level of certainty whereby he knew that Eisav would follow his command was sufficient to ensure that the knife was checked – as if someone else actually checked it. Thus Eisav – a mumar leteiavon- was permitted to shecht.

Although Yitzchak had reason to be concerned that Eisav would not check his knife on his own since he was a mumar leteiavon, he nonetheless knew that commanding him to do so would be the equivalent of someone else checking his knife for him. This permitted the meat to be eaten. Based on this, we can also answer the question that the ba'alei Tosafos asked (how Yitzchak could have eaten from the shechitah of a mumar). Since Eisav was considered a mumar leteiavon, once his father commanded him to check his knife his shechitah was permitted.

                For questions or comments e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 11/24/2011 03:57:00 PM

[KollelH blog] chaya sara

Did Avraham Already Own The Land?

In this weeks parsha we read of Avraham's purchase of M'aras Hamachpela. Prior to any negotiations Avraham said to the binai Chais "Ger t'toshav anochi" (23:4) - I am a stanger and a resident.  Rashi quotes a Medrish that explains the apparent paradox in Avraham's words as follows: Avraham was telling the binai Chais treat me like a stranger and sell me the property, and if not I will be forced to act as a resident and take what is rightfully mine. For Hashem has already said to me that this land will belong to my children. 

The Miforshim are bothered by this interpretation and ask the following question:  In parshas Lech Licha we learned of the dispute between Avraham's and Lot's shepherds. The passuk does not inform us regarding the details of the dispute, however Rashi does. Rashi says that Lot's shepards were risha'im and would allow their animals to graze in private property. Avraham's shepherds chastised them for this as it was stealing. In defense Lot's shepards responded that what they were doing was not stealing since Hashem gave this land to Avraham and Lot is his only inheritor (at the time). Rashi concludes by quoting the end of that passuk that says vihakinani vihaprizi az yoshaiv ba'aretz (and the Cinani and the Prizi were still occupying the land) indicating that Avraham had not yet acquired the land and therefore allowing the animals to graze in private property was indeed stealing.

The two explanations from Rashi seem to contradict one another. In this week's parsha he says that Avraham could take the land as its rightful owner, and in parshas Lech Licha he said that Avraham had not yet acquired the land.

The Chizkuni and the Sifsai Chachamim both suggest the following answer: Hashem promised Avraham that his children will inherit the land of Eretz Yisroel. In parshas Lech Licha Avraham had not yet had any offspring, therefore Hashem's promise did not come in to affect. In parshas Chaya Sarah, Yitzchok had already been born. Thus, Hashem's promise was applicable and Avraham could demand the land as its rightful owner. 

My rebbe, Reb Shmuel Birembaum zt"l, suggested another answer to this question, based on an explanation from the Malbimon on a different point in this episode. The Malbim explains that Avraham  Avinu intended on accomplishing more than merely acquiring a piece of land; he wanted to teach the public that there was an afterlife. The general consensus of that time was that there was nothing after one dies, and Avraham wanted to use this opportunity to teach them otherwise. With this the Malbim explains why Avraham informed them of his intentions with the field in the first place and continuously stressed and reiterated several times that he is acquiring the land for a burial; to instill in the binai Chais the belief that there is an afterlife.

Reb Shmuel proved from a Gemara in Gittin (47a) that there are two separate levels of acquisition; the monetary aspect and there is also a level of acquisition that affects issurim and mitzvos. For example if a non Jew acquires land in Eretz Yisroel he completely owns the land as far as monetary issues are concerned. This enables him to do whatever he pleases to the land. However regarding tiruma and ma'aser and other mitzvos the land is not considered owned by a non Jew which would exempt it from those mitzvos, rather it is obligated in these mitzvos since the non Jew cannot acquire the land on the level that affects mitzvos.

Now we can understand the seemingly contradictory explanations from Rashi. Regarding monetary issues Avraham had not yet acquired the land. However regarding mitzvos, Avraham had already acquired Eretz Yisroel. In parshas Lech Licha Rashi was addressing a monetary issue; i.e. whether one may allow his cattle graze in someone else's field. In that regard Rashi explained that the land belonged to the current residents of the land as Avraham had not yet acquired the land. In this week's parsha the issue at hand was relevant to mitzvos, as explained by the Malbim Avraham was using this acquisition as a means to teach the binai Chais to believe in afterlife. Thus Avraham was able to invoke his property rights as the matter pertained to mitzvos. 

I believe that Rashi in parshas Vayayra (18:17) seems to contradict pshat of the Sifsay Chachamim. Rashi says that Hashem informed Avraham of his plans to destroy Sedom because it belonged to him. At this point Yitzchok was not yet born, thus according to the Sifsay Chachamim the land did not yet belong to Avraham.  According to Reb Shmuel, Hashem wanted to inform Avraham of his plans since he owned the land regarding mitzvos.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 11/16/2011 09:33:00 PM

A satisfied life belongs to the easy to satisfy personality, & to no one else.

It is particularly challenging for great people to raise great children.

[KollelH blog] lech licha

Why Did Avraham Not Perform A Bris Earlier?

 

In this weeks parsha Hashem commands Avraham in the mitzvah of bris milah. We once discussed a question that several achronim ask regarding this mitzvah, and I wanted to share some new thoughts on the matter. The achronim ask that the Gemaras in Kiddushin 82a and Yuma 28b say that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, even though it was not yet given. Why then did Avraham not perform a bris milah on himself earlier? Why did he wait until he was commanded to do so at age 99?

The Mizrachi on this pasuk answers that the Gemara in Kiddushin 31a says that one who performs a mitzvah when he is commanded to do so is greater than one who performs it when he is not commanded. Since this mitzvah can only be performed once Avraham decided to wait until he was commanded to perform it.  

The Brisker Rav answers that Avraham kept the entire Torah even though it was not given. However certain mitzvos, due to the lack of their physical existence, were impossible for him to perform, and therefore were not considered as if he didn't perform them.

The mitzvah of bris milah is to remove the urla (foreskin). Before Avraham was commanded to perform a bris milah, there was no concept of urla. Prior to the commandment to remove the urla, there was no distinction between the foreskin and the rest of the skin, since the foreskin was not yet considered urla. Only once the Torah commanded him to remove the urla did the foreskin become urla. Thus prior to the commandment, Avraham could not perform the mitzvah of bris milah.

With this understanding we can also answer another question. The pasuk in this week's parsha (17:3) says that when Hashem spoke to Avraham regarding the mitzvah of bris milah, Avraham fell on his face. Rashi explains that this happened because he was an urel (uncircumcised male). We find that Hashem spoke to Avraham many times before this episode, so why only now did Avraham fall on his face because he was uncircumcised? According to the p'shat of the Brisker Rav, that prior to his commandment to be circumcised the foreskin was not considered urla, we can understand why Avraham never felt the need to fall on his face while talking to Hashem until this time – because before this commandment, he was not considered an urel.

Another example of a mitzvah where the concept did not exist prior to it being commanded is the mitzvah of kiddushin. Although there was a form of marriage before the Torah was given, it was of a different status. With this the Brisker Rav explains how Yaakov Avinu was permitted to marry sisters. He explains that only under the new status of kiddushin is it forbidden to marry sisters, whereas the marital status that existed prior to the giving of the Torah did not prohibit marrying sisters.

There is another answer as to why Avraham did not perform the mitzvah of bris milah prior to being commanded to do so, even though he kept the rest of the Torah. Bris milah is a bris (covenant) between two parties. Before the other party agrees to a covenant there cannot be a covenant. Therefore, prior to being commanded to perform a bris milah,

Avraham could not do so on his own – for it would not be a bris (covenant).

            The Panim Yafos (who also authored the sefer Hafla'ah) on this pasuk offers another answer to this question. He says that the prohibition of not wounding oneself extends to binai Noach as well. Therefore prior to being commanded, Avraham could not perform a bris mila on himself as it was prohibited to wound himself. He explains that this was the reason that the people of Avraham's generation protested Avraham's performing a bris, since they were not aware of the new commandment, they argued that it was prohibited. Thus Avraham had to perform the bris himself as no one else heard the commandment.

            I was bothered by the following question after reading the answer of the Panim Yafos: How is it that we are allowed to perform a bris mila today if it is in fact a violation of the prohibition against wounding oneself or another? One cannot answer that when the wound serves a purpose it is not prohibited, since in Avraham's case there was a purpose even prior to his being commanded to do so. Perhaps one could suggest that after the commandment to perform a bris mila we can apply the rule of assay docheh lo sassay and thus one may perform a bris even though he is making a wound. This would explain why Avraham could not perform a bris prior to his being commanded to do so since we cannot apply the rule of assay doche lo sassay before there was command to do that assay.    

For questions or comments about this column, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 11/03/2011 09:07:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Yom Kippor

Asking For Forgiveness From Your Fellow

The Mishnah in Yuma 85b says that Yom Kippur can atone for one's sins; however, it does not apply to all sins equally. The Mishnah says that Yom Kippur can atone for aveiros bein adam l'Makom (between man and God), but cannot atone for aveiros bein adam l'chaveiro (between one man and another man) unless the sinner has appeased the man he wronged. This is derived from the pasuk in Vayikra 16:30, "mikol chatoseichem lifnei Hashem titharu."

The Mishnah in Baba Kama 92a says that regarding an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro, even if one returns the stolen object or repays for damages he has incurred on another, he is not forgiven until he beseeches forgiveness from his fellow. This Mishnah derives this halacha from a pasuk in Bereishis 20:7, "v'atah hasheiv eishes ha'ish…"

The Sefer Harirai Kedem asks the following question: The two Mishnayos are seemingly teaching us the same halacha, namely that in order to be forgiven for aveiros bein adam l'chaveiro one must appease his fellow. Why do the Mishnayos derive this same halacha from two different pasukim?

I had the privilege of asking my rebbe, Reb Shmuel Birenbaum, zt"l, this question before Shacharis on Yom Kippur a number of years ago, and he shared the following thought with me: According to several Rishonim, every aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro had two aspects incorporated in them: there is the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect and there is also the bein adam l'Makom aspect, since Hashem forbade this action. Therefore we need two pasukim to teach us that one is not forgiven for transgressing an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro until he has appeased his fellow – one for each aspect of the aveirah, the bein adam l'Makom and the bein adam l'chaveiro.

The Sefer Harirai Kedem offers a different approach in explaining the necessity for two pasukim. He explains that the two Mishnayos are teaching two different halachos. The Mishnah in Baba Kama is referring to the general mitzvah of teshuvah. In order to do teshuvah for an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro one must ask his fellow for forgiveness. To achieve this forgiveness, it would suffice if his fellow told him that he forgives him, except that he doesn't want to have anything to do with him anymore.

The Mishnah in Yuma, though, is referring to the atonement of Yom Kippur, whereby simply asking for forgiveness is not sufficient. In order for Yom Kippur to provide atonement for an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro, one must appease the fellow that he wronged and remove any disdain from his heart toward him – like he felt before the incident. In fact the Mishnayos are meduyak (the wording is indicative) that they are teaching these two different halachos. The Mishnah in Baba Kama says that one must be mevakesh (beseeching) from his fellow, whereas the Mishnah in Yuma says that one must be meratzeh (make himself liked by) his fellow. (I have found that this is indicative in the Rambam as well. The Rambam writes these two halachos in separate places, one in Hilchos Teshuvah and the other in Hilchos Chovel U'mazik. He preserves the same wording – "meratzeh" in Hilchos Teshuvah regarding Yom Kippur, and "mevakesh" in Hilchos Chovel U'mazik concerning the general halacha of teshuvah.)

The reason that the atonement of Yom Kippur requires that one appease his fellow more than that of the regular teshuvah is because the atonement of Yom Kippur comes about via the tzibbur, as a communal atonement. Individuals attain atonement by virtue of being members of the tzibbur (community). In fact even the karban that is brought on Yom Kippur, the se'ir hamishtale'ach, is a karban tzibbur. Thus, in order that everyone should be able to connect to the tzibbur and utilize the atonement of the tzibbur, there must not be any barriers of conflict between members of the tzibbur.

I would like to suggest another answer as to why we need two pasukim to teach us that one must ask the fellow whom he wronged for forgiveness in order to achieve atonement on an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro. If the Torah had written only one pasuk, then all we would be able to learn from it is that as far as the mitzvah of teshuvah goes, one must ask his fellow for forgiveness, in addition to repaying him. But we would not necessarily know anything about how to attain forgiveness on Yom Kippur; in other words, we would not know that in order to be forgiven on Yom Kippur one must ask for forgiveness as well. This is because we would have thought that it is possible that one is forgiven on Yom Kippur without performing all the necessary components of teshuvah. Therefore the Torah wrote a separate pasuk, to inform us that even the atonement of Yom Kippur requires that one ask forgiveness of the fellow whom he wronged.

G'mar chasimah tovah.

For questions or comments e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 10/06/2011 10:48:00 PM

[KollelH blog] sorry its late, but better late than never

The Teshuvah Of Rosh Hashanah

There is a famous Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4 that says: "Although the blowing of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah is a decree from Hashem, there is a remez (reason) behind its blowing. The reason is that the sound of the shofar is to remind us to wake up from our slumber and inspect our actions, do teshuvah, and remember our creator. And those who have forgotten the truth and wasted their time should look into their souls and inspect their way of life. They should leave the wrong path that they find themselves on". Clearly the Rambam believes that on Rosh Hashanah one should do teshuvah, as he says that the shofar is to awaken us to do teshuvah. Similarly it would seem that one should do teshuvah on Rosh Hashanah, as it is part of the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah (10 Days of Repentance).

The Rambam says in the second perek of Hilchos Teshuvah that the mitzvah of teshuvah is comprised of four components: vidui (confession), charatah (regret), azivah (stopping oneself from sinning again), and kabbalah (resolution). The Rambam also says that one must verbalize his confessions in order for it to be valid. The Achronim are bothered by the following question: Why don't we find the teshuvah process to be a part of the Rosh Hashanah davening – as we do on Yom Kippur? Similarly there is no minhag to do the teshuvah process on Rosh Hashanah. Some even have the custom to not eat foods that have the same gematria as the word "chet" (sin). So if the shofar is to remind us to do teshuvah, why don't we do any of the teshuvah process on Rosh Hashanah?

The Gemara in Kiddushin 49b says that if one says to a woman "be mekudeshes (betrothed) to me on the condition that I am a tzaddik gamur (complete tzaddik)" and she accepts, the kiddushin is valid even if he is known to be a rasha gamur (complete sinner). This is because perhaps he was meharher b'teshuvah b'libo (thinking of teshuvah in his heart). The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 364) is bothered by how the kiddushin can be valid when it was contingent on the fact that the man was a tzaddik gamur, and instead he was a known rasha gamur? In order for him to become a tzaddik gamur he would have to go through the lengthy process of teshuvah that entails a verbal confession. How could he have accomplished all of that so quickly, and how did the witnesses not hear him repenting?

The Sefer Harirai Kedem and Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro explain that the teshuvah of Rosh Hashanah is different from that of Yom Kippur, and that of the mitzvah of teshuvah in general. The mitzvah of teshuvah indeed requires the abovementioned four-step process, and that is what we do on Yom Kippur as well. This form of teshuvah atones for and wipes clean one's sins. However, on Rosh Hashanah we do not do teshuvah on individual sins; rather, as the Rambam said earlier, the teshuvah is to awaken us from our sleep, remember our Creator, look into our souls, stop wasting our time with nothingness, and leave the wrong path as we return to the right path. With the teshuvah of Rosh Hashanah, one does not remove any of his individual sins; instead he changes his life's path, and his outlook and direction. Rosh Hashanah, the beginning of the 10 Days of Repentance, is the first step in the teshuvah process of the 10-day period. The days following Rosh Hashanah are focused on the mitzvah of teshuvah for individual sins – with Yom Kippur as the climax.

With this, the Sefer Harirai Kedem explains the Gemara in Kiddushin that is mentioned above. With the form of teshuvah that we do on Rosh Hashanah, a person becomes a tzaddik even though he has not done the mitzvah of teshuvah to remove his sins. Once he awakens from the wrong path and is determined to start following the right path, he attains the status of a tzaddik. Therefore, when the individual proposed kiddushin on condition that he is a tzaddik gamur, we can assume that perhaps he had this form of teshuvah in mind, namely to change direction – which does not require anything verbal and is not lengthy. Thus the kiddushin is valid, as he attained the status of a tzaddik even though he still has not atoned for his sins.

The Kotzker Rebbe suggested another explanation as to why the kiddushin is valid in the abovementioned Gemara in Kiddushin. We know that a chassan attains atonement of all of his sins without even doing teshuvah. Therefore, when one does kiddushin on condition that he is a tzaddik gamur, the kiddushin is valid since he will become a tzaddik gamur together with becoming a chassan.

G'mar chasimah tovah.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 10/05/2011 12:40:00 AM

[KollelH blog] kiseyvas Sefer Torah

The Mitzvah To Write A Sefer Torah

In this week's parshah the Torah writes:  "V'atah kisvu lachem es ha'shirah ha'zos…" – And now, write for yourselves this song (Devarim 31:19). Rashi explains that the song that the pasuk is referring to is the parshah of Ha'azinu. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 21B derives from this pasuk that every Jew is commanded to write an entire Sefer Torah. However, if the pasuk is referring to parshas Ha'azinu, how can the Gemara take from here a commandment to write the entire Torah?

The Rambam in Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:1 explains that since the halacha is that when one is writing Torah one cannot write only one parshah, one must write the entire Torah. Many Achronim were bothered by obvious questions. Why is it permitted to write the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos without writing the entire Torah? Why is it that only regarding the mitzvah of writing the song of Ha'azinu are we required to write the entire Torah?

The Chasam Sofer, in his Shailos U'teshuvos (Yoreh De'ah 254), answers that the Beis Yosef (in Orach Chaim 49) says that the reason why one is prohibited from writing only a single parshah of the Torah is because we derive many halachos from the juxtaposition of the parshiyos of the Torah. If one would write only a single parshah, one would not be able to properly learn from such a script. When the Torah commanded us to write the shirah, the aforementioned pasuk in Devarim 31:19 continues, "…v'lamdah es Bnei Yisrael simah b'fihem…" – and teach it to the Bnei Yisrael, place it in their mouths. Since the purpose of the mitzvah of writing the shirah of Ha'azinu is for us to learn from it, it must be written together with the rest of the Torah. The parshiyos of tefillin and mezuzah are not intended for one to learn from; rather, those parshiyos remain concealed. Therefore, regarding those mitzvos, one is permitted to write a single parshah without writing the entire Torah.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, zt"l, suggests another answer to the above question. When one is writing the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos, the writing is not the same as when one generally writes Torah. The halacha that one may not write only one parshah only applies when one is writing Torah generally. When one is writing a parshah for tefillin or mezuzah, he is permitted to write a single parshah because he is not writing Torah for the sake of writing Torah. Rather he is writing for a specific purpose, namely tefillin and mezuzah. As opposed to when one is writing the parshah of Ha'azinu, there is no specific mitzvah that he is writing for. Instead it is considered regular writing of Torah, which is subject to the halacha of not writing Torah as single parshiyos.

The Shagas Aryeh in siman 34 asks another interesting question on the abovementioned Rambam. The Rambam said that since one cannot write Torah in single parshiyos, we must write the entire Torah. The Shagas Aryeh asks, "Does the reason that we cannot write single parshiyos so change the actual mitzvah that now the mitzvah is to write the entire Torah? Or does the mitzvah remain to only write the parshah of Ha'azinu, and one only must write the entire Torah so as not to transgress the prohibition of writing Torah as single parshiyos. One difference between these two options is that if one transgressed and wrote only the parshah of Ha'azinu, would he have fulfilled the mitzvah of kisvu … es ha'shirah ha'zos? Another difference is, if one had written the entire Torah and then everything except for parshas Ha'azinu became erased or torn. If the mitzvah remains to write only the parshah of Ha'azinu in these cases, one would have fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. If the Torah had intended for us to figure out, based on the prohibition to write single parshiyos, that the mitzvah is actually to write the entire Torah, one would have not fulfilled his obligation in these cases.

The Shagas Aryeh concludes that the Rambam's wording is indicative of his understanding that the actual mitzvah was to write the entire Torah. Additionally, the Sefer Hachinuch, from where he quotes the Rambam, only quotes that one is obligated to write the Torah in its entirety – and neglects to quote the reason why one cannot write single parshiyos. This would indicate that the Chinuch understood that the Rambam was of the opinion that the prohibition to write single parshiyos was merely an indication for us to understand that the mitzvah was not to write parshas Ha'azinu alone; rather we are to write the Torah in its entirety. Therefore the Chinuch did not deem it necessary to inform us how we know that the mitzvah includes the entire Torah, since it is not part of the actual mitzvah. As a result, according to the Rambam, if one wrote only parshas Ha'azinu, or only parshas Ha'azinu remained from the entire Torah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation in this mitzvah.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 9/21/2011 11:16:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Ki Savo - Arvus: Does It Apply to Women

In parshas ki savo we read that Moshe divided the Binai Yisroel to receive brachos and klalos. He set six tribes on Har Grizim and six tribes on Har Aival, with the Kohanim, Leviyim, and the Aron in the valley. He told the Kohanim and leviyim to turn towards har Grizim and recite a blessing (i.e. Blessed is the man who does not make an idol…) and everyone should answer "Amen". Then the Kohanim and Leviyim would turn towards har Aival and recite a klala (such as Accursed is the man who makes an idol…) and everyone would say "Amen". The Gemarah in Sota 37b derives from this parsha the concept of arvus (responsibility)- that each member of klal Yisroel is responsible for the other members' obligations.

One common application of the concept of arvus is found in the Gemarah in Rosh Hashana 29a. Generally one can only perform a mitzvah and make a bracha on it when he is obligated in it. Once he fulfills his obligation in the mitzvah he can no longer recite a bracha over its performance since he is no longer obligated in it. The Gemarah says that one can perform a mitzvah and recite a bracha on behalf of another person and fulfill his obligation in the mitzvah for them even though he has already fulfilled his own obligation. Rashi explains that this is because all of Klal Yisroel are araivim one to each other regarding their obligation in mitzvos. The Ran there adds that since we are all araivim for each other, even though one person has already performed his mitzvah, as long as another person has not yet fulfilled his mitzvah it is considered as if the first one has not yet completely fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. Therefore he can perform the mitzvah with on his friend's behalf even with a bracha.

The Gemarah in Brachos 20b discusses whether a woman is obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa (from the Torah) or only midrabanan (from the Rabanan). The Gemarah says that if she is only obligated midrabanan she cannot recite brchas hamazon for a man who is obligated midoraisa. The R'Osh explains that this is because women are not included in arvus with men. There is a machlokes regarding the correct intent of this R'Osh.

The Dagol Mirvavah (written by the Nodeh B'Yehuda) takes the R'Osh literally; that women are not included in arvus with men. Rabbi Akiva Aiger understands that the R'Osh was only referring to the mitzvah of birchas hamazon. The R'Osh was discussing the opinion that said that women were not obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa. According to that opinion the R'Osh explained that women would not be included in the arvus with men who were obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa and thus would not be able to recite it on their behalf. However regarding all other mitzvos that women are obligated in, they would be included in the arvus with men.

One application of this machlokes is regarding Kiddush on Friday night. Once one has davened ma'ariv he has already fulfilled his obligation of kiddush midoraisa, since he mentioned 'mikadesh hashabbos' in his davening. However he is still obligated to recite kiddush again over a cup of wine midrabanan. Women are obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midoraisa. When a man comes home Friday night after davening he is no longer obligated in the mitzvah of Kiddush midoraisah. His wife on the other hand (if she has not davened) is obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midioraisa. The Dagol Mirvava says that in the view of the R'Osh, the husband would not be able to be motzi his wife in kiddish since she is not in arvus with him. Only if he had not davened, and thus was still obligated in the mitzvah midoraisa would he be able to be motzi her without arvus since he is obligated in the mitzvah on his own.

Rabbi Akiva Aiger argues that regarding the mitzvah of kiddush men and women are both included in arvus and therefore even if a man has already fulfilled his obligation he can still recite kiddish on behalf of a woman who is obligated midoraisa.

Additionally Rabbi Akiva Aiger points out that if the woman would merely say "Gut Shabbos" she would have fulfilled her obligation of kiddush midoraisa as well. Therefore even according to the Dagol Mirvava that they are not included in arvus together, after she says gut Shabbos, a man would be able to recite kiddish on her behalf.

{R.F.}

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 9/19/2011 11:47:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Eikev -

The Gemarah in Minachos 43b cites a Braisah that says: Reb Meir says one is obligated to make 100 brachos daily as it says in this week's parsha (10:12) Ma Hashem Elokecha shoel ma'imcha. Rashi on the Gemarah explains that we read the word "ma" as "meah" which means 100; so that the passuk reads as follows: "One hundred (daily brachos) is all that Hashem asks of you". Tosafos explains that we derive this obligation from the fact that there are 100 letters in this passuk when you read the word "ma" as "meah" (with the additional aleph). The BaHaG goes so far as to count this obligation amongst his count of 613 mitzvos!

Generally we assume that this obligation is upon each person to recite 100 brachos throughout his day. However it appears that some Rishonim understand that this is not merely an obligation on the individual, rather the mitzvah was intended for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom (daily order) in which the avodas hayom constitutes 100 brachos.

We find this concept in the Kol Bo siman 8. The Rambam says that maariv is a rishus (optional). The Kol Bo asks how can it be optional when the 24 brachos contained in maariv (5 of shima and 19 of shimoneh esray) are part of the count of the 100 brachos? The Kol Bo argues that maariv is not optional rather the meaning of "r'shus" is that one has the option to recite shimoneh esray before shkiya (sunset).

The Kol Bo's question on the Rambam can only be understood if we explain that his view of the meah brachos was meant for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom of brachos. Then he can ask how could maariv be optional leaving a deficit in the seder of 100 brachos.

With this explanation we can understand why the Gemarah in Minachos felt the need to calculate where one should make up the missing brachos on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when the shimoneh essray is shorter. The gemarah instructs that one should smell good spices and eat sweets and recite their brachos. Why does the Gemarah need to find solutions for us? Couldn't we have figured out how to total 100 brachos on our own?

However, according to our understanding of the Kol Bo, we can assume that the Gemarah is establishing the brachos of smelling spices and tasting treats as the seder hayom for Shabbos and Yom Tov!

With this we can also understand the p'sak of the Sh'lah (maseches Yoma) that on Yom Kippor there is no obligation to recite 100 brachos. If the obligation to recite 100 brachos was on the individual, then why should his individual duty be different on Yom Kippor? Even if one cannot eat or drink, he should find other ways to ensure that he recites 100 brachos! However if the halacha was for the Rabanan to establish an avodas hayom of 100 brachos, then we can understand that  Yom Kippor may have different seder hayom.

Taking this a step further, perhaps we can say that according to the Kol Bo and Sh'lah, women may be exempt from this obligation. Since women are not obligated in various different brachos of the general seder hayom (such as tallis, tiffilin, maariv, and krias shima) the avodas hayom of meah brachos may not pertain to them.

With this we can answer a question that is asked regarding the origin of the halacha to recite 100 brachos. The Medrash in Bamidbar Raba (18 :21)and the Tur Orach Chaim (siman 46) say that in Dovid Hamelech's time every day 100 people would die and no one knew why. As a result Dovid Hamelech instituted that everyone must recite 100 brachos daily. There seems to be in contradictionwith the Gemarah in Minachos says that Reb Meir derived this mitzvah from a passuk without any mention of Dovid Hamelech.
With approach above, I want to suggest that Dovid Hamelech made an obligation on the individual to recite 100 brachos every day. One could choose to make whichever brachos he would please. The halacha mentioned in the Gemarah in the name of Reb Meir is the obligation on the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom by which one should follow and recite the specific 100 brachos.

Enjoy the seder hayom of Shabbos! {R.F.}

For questions or comments on this dvar torah email rabbirfuchs@gmail.com

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 8/18/2011 11:53:00 PM