At the conclusion of this week's parsha the Torah commands us in the mitzvah of tzitzis. The Gimorah in Yivamos 4a learns from a drasha that one may wear shatnez (wool and linen) in his tzitzis, and that this is the source in the Torah that asay is doche losasay- the asay of tzitzis allows one to transgress the losasay of shatnez.
The Bris Avraham asks a question on the Gimorah based on the following two notions: first the Gimorah in Yivamos 4b says the Torah only prohibited shatnez when the one wearing the shatnez derives a physical benefit from the garment. Second, the opinion of the Rashba in Niddarim 15a is that the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu (mitzvos were not given for pleasure purposes) dictates that any physical benefit derived from the performance of a mitzvah is not considered pleasure. Based on these premises the Bris Avraham suggests that while wearing tzitzis one will not be deriving benefit from the garment. Therefore even if the garment contains shatnez one would not be prohibited from wearing it since one is only prohibited to wear shatnez when he derives benefit from the garment. How can the Gimorah learn that asay is doche a losasay from the fact that tzitzis can be worn with shatnez, if when one wears tzitzis with shatnez there is no prohibition of shatnez at all?
The Bris Avraham answers that we only apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu if one could not perform the mitzvah in any other manner other than by trangresing the avaira. In the case of tzitzis one is not required to wear a linen garment creating a situation of shatnez. Therefore when the Torah says that we may wear linen garments with wool strings, it is not as a result of the general rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu since there is a way to perform the mitzvah without transgressing any prohibitions- a wool garment with wool strings.
The Imrai Bina (hilchos tzitzis 3) offers another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham. Mitzvos can be categorized in two groups: mitzvos in which physical pleasure is an integral part of the mitzvah for example eating, and mitzvos whose essence is unrelated to receiving any pleasure for example Tiffilin. The Rashba that we cited earlier that is of the opinion that any pleasure derived while performing a mitzvah is allowed even if it would otherwise be forbidden, only applies to the mitzvos that the pleasure is not an integral part of the mitzvah. If one derives pleasure from such a mitzvah we say he is not doing the action for the sake of the pleasure rather for the sake of the mitzvah and is therefore permitted. Whereas if the mitzvah itself requires one to receive pleasure we will not allow one to receive that pleasure from a forbidden source for he is in fact acting for the sake of the pleasure. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis for it is a mitzvah that requires one to receive pleasure, namely the warmth of the garment.
We find this concept from the Rishon Reb Avraham Min Hahar in Niddarim 48. The Mishna says that one can prohibit one to learn Torah from his sefer by making a nedder. Reb Avraham Min Hahar asks how can one forbid one to learn Torah? Since learning Torah is a mitzvah we should apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu. He answers that we only say mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu regarding mitzvos that are primarily action based, therefore when there is any pleasure derived we can disqualify it since that is not the reason for the action. However the mitzvah of learning Torah is primarily and essentially for the sake of pleasure and enjoyment. It for that reason that an uvel (morner) is forbidden to learn Torah, as the passuk states pikudai Hashem yisharim misamchai lev. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of learning Torah since we cannot say that one is not acting for the sake of pleasure, for by this mitzvah one indeed is seeking the pleasure that accompanies the mitzvah.
I want to suggest another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham of how can we learn from the allowance of shatnez in tzitzis that asay is doche a losasay if by tzitzis there is no prohibition of shatnez since one is not deriving benefit from the garment according to the Rashba. I think that when the Rashba said that any pleasure derived from a mitzvah is not considered pleasure it was only to say that the forbidden pleasure would be permitted if derived from a mitzvah. However the Rashba would agree that there is a physical pleasure that is derived, only that it is not forbidden under theses circumstances. Therefore with regards to shatnez we only require one to derive benefit from the garment in order for it to be considered that he is wearing the garment containing shatnez. If one is not deriving benefit from a garment he is not considered wearing it. The actual pleasure is not prohibited; rather it is a precondition in wearing the garment. Although the pleasure derived while performing the mitzvah of tzitzis will be permitted it is nonetheless a pleasure and should be sufficient to consider the garment worn. Therefore even if we apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis there would still be a necessity for asay doche losasay.
{R.F.}
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/17/2011 02:14:00 PM
Friday, June 17, 2011
Thursday, June 16, 2011
Monday, June 6, 2011
[KollelH blog] The Geirus Of Mattan Torah
The Rama (Orach Chaim 490:9) says that we are accustomed to reading Megillas
Rus on Shavuos. The Vilna Gaon suggests that the reason for this custom is that since our
fathers accepted the Torah on Shavuos, and thereby were nisga'er (converted), we read
the megillah that discusses Rus, who similarly was nisgarah.
The Gemaras, in Yevamos 46a and Krisus 9a, say that at Mattan Torah Klal
Yisrael entered into a bris through geirus. We learn several halachos of geirus for future
generations from the geirus of Mattan Torah. One halacha that we learn is that just as
our fathers required milah, tevilah and korban to convert, future converts require the
same.
The Gemara in Shabbos 130a explains the pasuk in Bamidbar 11:10, "Vayishma
Moshe es ha'um boche l'mishpichosam," as follows: The Bnei Yisrael were crying over the fact
that they became forbidden to marry their relatives after Mattan Torah. The Maharal (in
Gur Aryeh Parshas Vayigash,) asks about the Gemara in Yevamos 22a that says that a
ger can marry his biological sister because ger she'nisgaer k'katan she'nolad dami – a
convert is considered as if he was just born; therefore he is not considered related to his
biological family, even if they too subsequently convert. Since, as stated earlier, Bnei
Yisrael became converts at Mattan Torah, why then were Bnei Yisrael in that generation
crying over the prohibition of marrying relatives? Since they were converts, they had no
relatives that were forbidden to them!
The Maharal answers that the rule of ger she'nisgaer k'katan she'nolad dami can
only be applied to someone who converts willingly, by his own volition. Since at Mattan
Torah, Hashem forced Bnei Yisrael to accept the Torah, we cannot apply the rule and they
became forbidden to marry their relatives.
The sefer, Harirai Kedem, explains that the geirus of Mattan Torah was not
that each individual converted on an individual level all at once; rather it was a geirus
of the tzibur (communal conversion). By Mattan Torah the entire nation converted as
one; when all of Klal Yisrael proclaimed "na'aseh v'nishma" - k'ish echad b'lev echad, it
was an acceptance of the yoke of the Torah and mitzvos as a whole nation. The Rambam
(Hilchos Isssurei Biah 13:3) writes that the korban at Mattan Torah was brought al
yidai kol Yisrael. The Rambam seems to say that the korban was a korban tzibur. We
can understand that since there was a conversion of the tzibur, the tzibur had to bring a
korban tzibur.
Based on this we can answer the Maharal's question mentioned earlier of why
the Bnei Yisrael of that generation cried over their newly forbidden relatives. We only
say that a convert is considered to be newborn and unrelated to his biological family –
even if they later convert, when a ger first converts alone. As explained earlier, at Mattan
Torah the geirus was not an individual conversion, but rather it was one geirus which
incorporated the entire nation. Perhaps as one geirus, everyone's biological relatives remain their relatives. Therefore Bnei Yisrael of the generation of Mattan Torah cried over the prohibition to marry relatives.
The Gemara in Kisubos 11a quotes Rav Huna that bais din can convert a ger
kattan (a minor who his mother had brought to convert). The Gemara seeks a possible
source for Rav Huna's halacha from various mishnayos – but to no avail. The Ritvah
asks why the Gemara doesn't suggest that the source for Rav Huna'a halacha is from
Mattan Torah. After all, there were k'tanim present at Mattan Torah. And if the geirus
of Mattan Torah was not similar to that of Rav Huna's halacha, then how did the geirus
of Mattan Torah work on k'tanim?
Based on the aforementioned explanation that the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur, we can answer the Ritvah's question. The Gemara cannot cite Mattan
Torah as a source for Rav Huna's halacha because the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur. Therefore, as members of the tzibur, the k'tanim were included in
the geirus. However a private geirus performed by beis din may arguably not be done on behalf of a kattan.
{R.F.}
For questions or comments regarding this dvar torah, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/07/2011 12:55:00 AM
Rus on Shavuos. The Vilna Gaon suggests that the reason for this custom is that since our
fathers accepted the Torah on Shavuos, and thereby were nisga'er (converted), we read
the megillah that discusses Rus, who similarly was nisgarah.
The Gemaras, in Yevamos 46a and Krisus 9a, say that at Mattan Torah Klal
Yisrael entered into a bris through geirus. We learn several halachos of geirus for future
generations from the geirus of Mattan Torah. One halacha that we learn is that just as
our fathers required milah, tevilah and korban to convert, future converts require the
same.
The Gemara in Shabbos 130a explains the pasuk in Bamidbar 11:10, "Vayishma
Moshe es ha'um boche l'mishpichosam," as follows: The Bnei Yisrael were crying over the fact
that they became forbidden to marry their relatives after Mattan Torah. The Maharal (in
Gur Aryeh Parshas Vayigash,) asks about the Gemara in Yevamos 22a that says that a
ger can marry his biological sister because ger she'nisgaer k'katan she'nolad dami – a
convert is considered as if he was just born; therefore he is not considered related to his
biological family, even if they too subsequently convert. Since, as stated earlier, Bnei
Yisrael became converts at Mattan Torah, why then were Bnei Yisrael in that generation
crying over the prohibition of marrying relatives? Since they were converts, they had no
relatives that were forbidden to them!
The Maharal answers that the rule of ger she'nisgaer k'katan she'nolad dami can
only be applied to someone who converts willingly, by his own volition. Since at Mattan
Torah, Hashem forced Bnei Yisrael to accept the Torah, we cannot apply the rule and they
became forbidden to marry their relatives.
The sefer, Harirai Kedem, explains that the geirus of Mattan Torah was not
that each individual converted on an individual level all at once; rather it was a geirus
of the tzibur (communal conversion). By Mattan Torah the entire nation converted as
one; when all of Klal Yisrael proclaimed "na'aseh v'nishma" - k'ish echad b'lev echad, it
was an acceptance of the yoke of the Torah and mitzvos as a whole nation. The Rambam
(Hilchos Isssurei Biah 13:3) writes that the korban at Mattan Torah was brought al
yidai kol Yisrael. The Rambam seems to say that the korban was a korban tzibur. We
can understand that since there was a conversion of the tzibur, the tzibur had to bring a
korban tzibur.
Based on this we can answer the Maharal's question mentioned earlier of why
the Bnei Yisrael of that generation cried over their newly forbidden relatives. We only
say that a convert is considered to be newborn and unrelated to his biological family –
even if they later convert, when a ger first converts alone. As explained earlier, at Mattan
Torah the geirus was not an individual conversion, but rather it was one geirus which
incorporated the entire nation. Perhaps as one geirus, everyone's biological relatives remain their relatives. Therefore Bnei Yisrael of the generation of Mattan Torah cried over the prohibition to marry relatives.
The Gemara in Kisubos 11a quotes Rav Huna that bais din can convert a ger
kattan (a minor who his mother had brought to convert). The Gemara seeks a possible
source for Rav Huna's halacha from various mishnayos – but to no avail. The Ritvah
asks why the Gemara doesn't suggest that the source for Rav Huna'a halacha is from
Mattan Torah. After all, there were k'tanim present at Mattan Torah. And if the geirus
of Mattan Torah was not similar to that of Rav Huna's halacha, then how did the geirus
of Mattan Torah work on k'tanim?
Based on the aforementioned explanation that the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur, we can answer the Ritvah's question. The Gemara cannot cite Mattan
Torah as a source for Rav Huna's halacha because the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur. Therefore, as members of the tzibur, the k'tanim were included in
the geirus. However a private geirus performed by beis din may arguably not be done on behalf of a kattan.
{R.F.}
For questions or comments regarding this dvar torah, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/07/2011 12:55:00 AM
[KollelH blog] Kabalas HaTorah
"Moshe brought the people forth from the camp toward Hashem, and they stood under the mountain." (Yisro 19:17)
The Gemara brings a statement in Maseches Shabbos (88a) that Hashem, during Kabalas HaTorah, held Har Sinai over the Jews and forced acceptance of the Torah. One familiar with the basic storyline is struck with a glaring question: The Jews had already declared their commitment to Hashem with the utterance "Na'aseh v'Nishmah," ("we will do and we will hear"). Why should Hashem "force" the Jewish people into a situation after the Jewish people had already confirmed their relationship with Hashem and the Torah in no uncertain terms? Further, framing acceptance of the Torah in this context would only seem to take away from the Jews independent kabalah!
No ink has been spared on this question. One answer generally brought by chazal is that of Tosafos, that Hashem was concerned that that the Jews would change their minds out of fear upon experiencing the awesome spectacle at Har Sinai. Another oft cited opinion is found in Medrash Tanchuma (Parshas Noach) that the declaration of Na'aseh v'Nishmah was made only in connection Torah She'Biksav. The Jews, however, at that time, were not willing to accept upon themselves Torah She'Ba'al Peh and had to be coerced. The Medrash concludes that the ameilus necessary to engage in the limud of Torah She'Ba'al Peh can come about only through ahavas Hashem. Notably, the Gemara says that the Jews lovingly 're-accepted' the Torah after the events of Purim.
I would like to propose another approach to answer why the Torah was given with the "mountain over our heads" that is perhaps more relevant to our generation than ever before:
The Rambam enumerates 13 ikkarim - known as 'the 13 ani ma'amins' - that one must fully believe and accept in order to be considered a religious Jew. Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg, in his discussion of the 1st of the ikkarim, explains that one must believe and internalize the absoluteness of Hashem. (article available at http://www.aish.com/sp/ph/48923722.html). The Rambam (explained by Rabbi Weinberg) maintains that the truth of the Torah itself depends upon its being derivative from an absolute source.
Without an objective source for Torah ideals, any ethical system can be judged in terms of modern day thinking. One could not otherwise explain seeming inconsistencies such as why it is one of the "big 3 aveiros" to murder, and yet a Torah commandment to kill Amalek. After all, one may argue, it is unfair to hold Amalek's descendants accountable for their ancestor's actions at the time of Yetzias Mitrayim. The absolute objectivity of the Source of our religion explains why we calibrate ourselves to the Torah rather than judge the Torah by modern day standards.
I would like to introduce a thought based on something I once heard from R' Yitzchak Berkowitz. Throughout history, there were generally accepted societal ideals despite rationalizations that may have been employed to justify contrary modes of conduct; As is often said, one does not have to be a triangle to teach geometry.
By contrast, one does not have to look very far into the headlines of today to see that the average person growing up has no way to distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, appropriate from inappropriate or even what values one should prioritize. (See articles "UN Document Would Give 'Mother Earth' Same Rights as Humans http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/04/13-2 .)
Therefore, the Torah had to be given with the mountain "over our heads" (whether midrashim are meant to be taken literally is beyond the scope of this dvar torah); it had to be muchrach. Indeed, the Jewish people had already committed themselves. However, if our acceptance of the Torah was based solely on our kabalah, the introduction of Torah to the world, and to the Jewish people, would have historically been tied to the acknowledgement of a nation at a given point in time. There would be room for the argument that their acceptance was appropriate for the time, but, after all, times have changed!
Accordingly, the introduction of the Torah into creation had to indicate that Torah is intrinsically 'absolute'. Not originating or dependant upon the approval of mankind. Rather the Torah is an objective source of truth from Hashem, to be referred to by all people of all origins in any generation, independent of the Jews' acceptance at that time.
May we be zocheh to once again to adjust ourselves and our mindsets to the priorities and ideals of the Torah and be Mekabel the Torah b'ahavah this Shavuos!
Gut Yom Tov! {M.R.}
To comment on this dvar torah email michaeljrubin@gmail.com or kollelh@gmail.com
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/07/2011 12:41:00 AM
The Gemara brings a statement in Maseches Shabbos (88a) that Hashem, during Kabalas HaTorah, held Har Sinai over the Jews and forced acceptance of the Torah. One familiar with the basic storyline is struck with a glaring question: The Jews had already declared their commitment to Hashem with the utterance "Na'aseh v'Nishmah," ("we will do and we will hear"). Why should Hashem "force" the Jewish people into a situation after the Jewish people had already confirmed their relationship with Hashem and the Torah in no uncertain terms? Further, framing acceptance of the Torah in this context would only seem to take away from the Jews independent kabalah!
No ink has been spared on this question. One answer generally brought by chazal is that of Tosafos, that Hashem was concerned that that the Jews would change their minds out of fear upon experiencing the awesome spectacle at Har Sinai. Another oft cited opinion is found in Medrash Tanchuma (Parshas Noach) that the declaration of Na'aseh v'Nishmah was made only in connection Torah She'Biksav. The Jews, however, at that time, were not willing to accept upon themselves Torah She'Ba'al Peh and had to be coerced. The Medrash concludes that the ameilus necessary to engage in the limud of Torah She'Ba'al Peh can come about only through ahavas Hashem. Notably, the Gemara says that the Jews lovingly 're-accepted' the Torah after the events of Purim.
I would like to propose another approach to answer why the Torah was given with the "mountain over our heads" that is perhaps more relevant to our generation than ever before:
The Rambam enumerates 13 ikkarim - known as 'the 13 ani ma'amins' - that one must fully believe and accept in order to be considered a religious Jew. Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg, in his discussion of the 1st of the ikkarim, explains that one must believe and internalize the absoluteness of Hashem. (article available at http://www.aish.com/sp/ph/48923722.html). The Rambam (explained by Rabbi Weinberg) maintains that the truth of the Torah itself depends upon its being derivative from an absolute source.
Without an objective source for Torah ideals, any ethical system can be judged in terms of modern day thinking. One could not otherwise explain seeming inconsistencies such as why it is one of the "big 3 aveiros" to murder, and yet a Torah commandment to kill Amalek. After all, one may argue, it is unfair to hold Amalek's descendants accountable for their ancestor's actions at the time of Yetzias Mitrayim. The absolute objectivity of the Source of our religion explains why we calibrate ourselves to the Torah rather than judge the Torah by modern day standards.
I would like to introduce a thought based on something I once heard from R' Yitzchak Berkowitz. Throughout history, there were generally accepted societal ideals despite rationalizations that may have been employed to justify contrary modes of conduct; As is often said, one does not have to be a triangle to teach geometry.
By contrast, one does not have to look very far into the headlines of today to see that the average person growing up has no way to distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, appropriate from inappropriate or even what values one should prioritize. (See articles "UN Document Would Give 'Mother Earth' Same Rights as Humans http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/04/13-2 .)
Therefore, the Torah had to be given with the mountain "over our heads" (whether midrashim are meant to be taken literally is beyond the scope of this dvar torah); it had to be muchrach. Indeed, the Jewish people had already committed themselves. However, if our acceptance of the Torah was based solely on our kabalah, the introduction of Torah to the world, and to the Jewish people, would have historically been tied to the acknowledgement of a nation at a given point in time. There would be room for the argument that their acceptance was appropriate for the time, but, after all, times have changed!
Accordingly, the introduction of the Torah into creation had to indicate that Torah is intrinsically 'absolute'. Not originating or dependant upon the approval of mankind. Rather the Torah is an objective source of truth from Hashem, to be referred to by all people of all origins in any generation, independent of the Jews' acceptance at that time.
May we be zocheh to once again to adjust ourselves and our mindsets to the priorities and ideals of the Torah and be Mekabel the Torah b'ahavah this Shavuos!
Gut Yom Tov! {M.R.}
To comment on this dvar torah email michaeljrubin@gmail.com or kollelh@gmail.com
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 6/07/2011 12:41:00 AM
Sunday, May 22, 2011
[KollelH blog] Ma’aser B'haimah
At the conclusion of this week's parsha (27:32) the Torah discusses the obligation to give ma'aser (tithe) from one's animals. The newborn cattle are put into a corral with a narrow opening big allowing for only one animal to leave at a time. As the animals leave they are counted, and every tenth one is marked as ma'aser to be given to a kohen.
The Mishnah in Bichoros( 58b) discusses a scenario where during the counting before the owner had reached number ten, one of the animals that were already counted jumped back in to the corral and he cannot distinguish between the animals. The Mishnah says that all the animals are exempt from ma'aser. The Gimorah in Baba Mitzeia (6b) explains this ruling based on a drasha from the passuk "hasiri yiheye kodesh l'Hashem". The Gimorah explains that the Torah requires that one be certain that the tenth animal is the tenth. If there is any doubt that this animal is the tenth it is not ma'aser (asiri vadai vilo asiri safek). Additionally once an animal was counted it cannot be counted again. Since he cannot distinguish between the animals he might count the animal that was already counted, thereby making it impossible to count with certainty. Therefore all of the animals are exempt from ma'aser since we cannot ensure that any of them will be the definite tenth one out of the corral.
The shita mikubetzes in Baba Mitzeia (6b) cites a R"Ash that asks: why does the Mishnah say that since the animals cannot be counted precisely all of the animals in the corral exempt from ma'aser, why can't we apply the rule of kal d'parish mairuba parish- if something separates from a group we can assume it belonged to the majority of the group? Since the majority of animals in the corral were not counted, as each animal separates and passes through the door of the corral we should assume that it was never counted, thus enabling the animals to be counted properly and be obligated in ma'aser.
The R"Ash answers that although the Torah allowed us to rely on a rov (majority) in most scenarios, nevertheless it remains a safek (doubt). Therefore with regard to ma'aser where the Torah requires that we know with certainty that the tenth animal is the tenth we cannot rely on a rov.
Reb Akiva Aiger (in tishuvos tinyana 108) asks the following question: An animal that is a traifa is exempt from ma'aser. The only way to know that an animal is not a traifa is to rely on the rov that most animals are healthy and not traifos. However according to the Rush that said that even though the Torah allowed us to rely on a rov it still remains a safek how can we ever have an animal that is obligated in ma'aser? We will not know with certainty that it is the tenth since possibly the first nine were traifos. And even though there is a rov that says that they were not traifos according to the Rush that is not considered knowing with certainty.
The Shev Shimaitza (2 :15) answers that there are two different types of rov; ruba dilesa kaman, and ruba dieisa kaman. A ruba dilesa kaman refers to tendencies in nature or habit. For example that most animals are healthy and not tiraifos, or that most babies born are healthy, or that most people who will shecht(slaughter) know how to do so properly. A ruba dieisa kaman refers to the majority of present chances. For example if there are ten pieces of meat of which nine are kosher and one is not and one is selected the rov says it is a kosher piece of meat.
The Shev Shimaitza says that the Rush only said that even after applying a rov it still remains a safek regarding a ruba dieisa kaman such as in the case of the animal that was counted that jumped back into the coral. Whereas regarding a rov such as the rov that most animals are not tiraifa which is a ruba dilesa kaman the Rush would agree that in applying the rov there remains no safek and one can be certain that it will be from the rov. Therefore regarding the doubt if the animals are tiraifos we can say with certainty that they are not traifos and therefore the tenth animal is with certainty the tenth and thus obligated in ma'aser.
{R.F.}
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/22/2011 11:02:00 PM
The Mishnah in Bichoros( 58b) discusses a scenario where during the counting before the owner had reached number ten, one of the animals that were already counted jumped back in to the corral and he cannot distinguish between the animals. The Mishnah says that all the animals are exempt from ma'aser. The Gimorah in Baba Mitzeia (6b) explains this ruling based on a drasha from the passuk "hasiri yiheye kodesh l'Hashem". The Gimorah explains that the Torah requires that one be certain that the tenth animal is the tenth. If there is any doubt that this animal is the tenth it is not ma'aser (asiri vadai vilo asiri safek). Additionally once an animal was counted it cannot be counted again. Since he cannot distinguish between the animals he might count the animal that was already counted, thereby making it impossible to count with certainty. Therefore all of the animals are exempt from ma'aser since we cannot ensure that any of them will be the definite tenth one out of the corral.
The shita mikubetzes in Baba Mitzeia (6b) cites a R"Ash that asks: why does the Mishnah say that since the animals cannot be counted precisely all of the animals in the corral exempt from ma'aser, why can't we apply the rule of kal d'parish mairuba parish- if something separates from a group we can assume it belonged to the majority of the group? Since the majority of animals in the corral were not counted, as each animal separates and passes through the door of the corral we should assume that it was never counted, thus enabling the animals to be counted properly and be obligated in ma'aser.
The R"Ash answers that although the Torah allowed us to rely on a rov (majority) in most scenarios, nevertheless it remains a safek (doubt). Therefore with regard to ma'aser where the Torah requires that we know with certainty that the tenth animal is the tenth we cannot rely on a rov.
Reb Akiva Aiger (in tishuvos tinyana 108) asks the following question: An animal that is a traifa is exempt from ma'aser. The only way to know that an animal is not a traifa is to rely on the rov that most animals are healthy and not traifos. However according to the Rush that said that even though the Torah allowed us to rely on a rov it still remains a safek how can we ever have an animal that is obligated in ma'aser? We will not know with certainty that it is the tenth since possibly the first nine were traifos. And even though there is a rov that says that they were not traifos according to the Rush that is not considered knowing with certainty.
The Shev Shimaitza (2 :15) answers that there are two different types of rov; ruba dilesa kaman, and ruba dieisa kaman. A ruba dilesa kaman refers to tendencies in nature or habit. For example that most animals are healthy and not tiraifos, or that most babies born are healthy, or that most people who will shecht(slaughter) know how to do so properly. A ruba dieisa kaman refers to the majority of present chances. For example if there are ten pieces of meat of which nine are kosher and one is not and one is selected the rov says it is a kosher piece of meat.
The Shev Shimaitza says that the Rush only said that even after applying a rov it still remains a safek regarding a ruba dieisa kaman such as in the case of the animal that was counted that jumped back into the coral. Whereas regarding a rov such as the rov that most animals are not tiraifa which is a ruba dilesa kaman the Rush would agree that in applying the rov there remains no safek and one can be certain that it will be from the rov. Therefore regarding the doubt if the animals are tiraifos we can say with certainty that they are not traifos and therefore the tenth animal is with certainty the tenth and thus obligated in ma'aser.
{R.F.}
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/22/2011 11:02:00 PM
Sunday, May 15, 2011
[KollelH blog] Sefirah and Aleinu
We count siferas haomer at the beginning of the night at the conclusion of Maariv. There
are different customs regarding the proper order in which to recite the counting of sefiras
haomer; before or after Aleinu.
The sefer Sharai Rachamim from the Vilna Gaon says that one should first say Aleinu and count siferas haomer afterwards. The Chak Yakkov (489:20), and the Pri Migadim (A"A 489:15), and the Mishnah Birurah (489:2) say that the proper order is to count siferas haomer first and then to say Aleinu.
In order to better understand the basis for this machlokes we must look at the origin
of the custom to say Aleinu at the end of davening. Was Aleinu instituted to be the
conclusion of each Tefila, or was it instituted to be the last prayer that we recite prior to
leaving the shul?
The Bach in Orach Chaim 133 explains that Aleinu was added at the conclusion of
davening before people left the shull in order to instill faith of the Oneness of Hashem's
kingship, and in order to strengthen our emuna that He will one day remove idolatry from the earth, thus preventing Jews from being tempted to follow the beliefs and lifestyles of the nations among whom they dwell and engage in business with. It seems clear that the Bach is of the opinion that Aleinu was instituted primarily as the last tefila prior to leaving the shul.
The Sharei Teshuva in Orach Chaim 233:1 cites the Ar"i z"l that one must recite Aleinu
after each of the three tifelos of the day. The Ar"i z"l seems to hold that Aleinu was
instituted as part of davening.
The Chasam Sofer was accustomed not to say Aleinu after Mincha on erev Shabbos
since we remain in shul for Maariv. This is in accordance with the Bach that said Aleinu
was instituted as the last tifela prior to leaving the shull. It is for that reason that we do
not say Aleinu after Mussaf or Mincha on Yom Kippor, since we do not leave the shul
after these tefilos.
Perhaps this is the reason why many have the custom not to recite Aleinu after Shacharis
on Shabbos, even though it is the end of a tefila, since we do not leave the shull until
on Shabbos, even though it is the end of a tefila, since we do not leave the shull until
after the conclusion of the next tefila; Mussaf. There are those that have the custom to
say Aleinu after Shacharis on Shabbos and to repeat it after Mussaf. This custom is in
accordance with the opinion of the Ar"i z"l that Aleinu was instituted as a part of each
tefila. It is possible that even the custom of not saying Aleinu after Shacharis on Shabbos
is in accordance with the Ar"i z"l, since we daven Shacharis and Mussaf together they are
considered as one tefila therefore one need not say Aleinu after Shacharis.
Based on this, the sefer Harirai Kedem explains that we can understand the machlokes
regarding the proper order in which to count siferas haomer in respect to Aleinu. If
Aleinu is a part of tiffela then it should precede counting siferas haomer, since siferas
haomer is a mitzvah that can be performed after maariv as well we can apply the rule of
tadir v'sheaino tadir tadir kodem- the more frequent precedes the less frequent. As Aleinu
is a part of maariv and maariv is more frequent, the entire maariv (including Aleinu)
should precede counting siferas haomer. Whereas if Aleinu was instituted as the last
tefila said prior to leaving the shul then one should first count siferas haomer and allow
for Aleinu to be the last tiffela said prior to leaving the shul.
I thought that perhaps this is the basis for the different customs regarding the order in
which we recite Aleinu and the shir shel yom at the conclusion of Shacharis each day.
Most people who daven Nusach Ashkenaz recite Aleinu after ashrai uva litzion which is the conclusion of the tefila. They say the shir shel yom following Aleinu.
Sefardim and those who daven Nusach Sefard recite the shir shel yom
first and Aleinu last.
Nusach Ashkinaz seems to be in accordance with the Ar"i z"l that Aleinu is a conclusion to the tefila. The Sefardim and Nusach Sefard seem to go in accordance with the Bach that Aleinu is to be said as the last tefila prior to going out among the nations which we dwell between. This is interesting as it is usually Sefard that follows the customs of the Ar'i z"l and not Nusach Ashkenaz, here we see the opposite.
{R.F.}
To comment, email RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/15/2011 11:13:00 PM
Friday, May 6, 2011
[KollelH blog] Emor - Chadash and Yoshon
The passuk in this week's parsha (23: 14) says : ולחם וקלי וכרמל לא תאכלו עד עצם היום הזה עד הביאכם את קרבן אלוהיכם - And you shall not eat bread etc. until this very day, until you bring the offering of your God. This passuk teaches us that all of the five grains (wheat, spelt, rye, oats, and barley) from the time they are harvested are forbidden until after the korban Omer is brought. However if the grain had already
taken root prior to the bringing of the korban that grain is permitted. Today that we do not
have a bais hamikdash and cannot bring the korban Omer the new grain is permitted after
the day the korban would have been brought; in Eretz Yisroel after the 16th day of Nissan,
and in Chutz L'aretz it is permitted after the 17th day of Nissan.
The Rama in Yorah Deah (293:3) cites the Tur in the name of the R"Ash that says that
if one has grain that he does not know when it grew it is permitted to eat because of a
s'fek s'faika (double safek). One safek is did it grow entirely before pessach or after. The
second safek is that even if it grew after pessach perhaps it took root before pessach and
would thus be permitted.
Many Achronim (R' Akiva Aiger, the Nisivos, the Kraisi Uplaisi) were bothered by
this p'sak. They asked that this is not two separate sifakos rather it is one safek; did
the korban Omer pass and permit this grain. What does it matter if it grew entirely
before pessach or only took root by then, in both scenarios the korban permits the grain.
Therefore it should not be regarded as a s'fek s'faika, and should be forbidden.
The Uruch Hashulchan in Yorah Deah 293:16 suggests the following explanation for the
p'sak of the Rama. He says that if there is a nafka mina (halachic difference) between the
two sifakos then we can still apply the rule of s'fek s'faika even if they are essentially one
safek. He writes that there is a nafka mina between whether the grain grew last year or
if it only took root before the korban Omer. If it grew last year we would not be able to
use it in the korban Omer, whereas if it grew this year and took root before the korban we
would be able to use it for the korban. He adds although this difference is not applicable
nowadays nonetheless it is sufficient to separate the two s'faikos and apply a s'fek s'faika.
The sefer Harirai Kedem suggests that indeed there is a difference whether the grain
grew before the korban Omer was brought and if the grain had only taken root before
the korban was brought. Grain that grew at least a third before the korban was brought
becomes forbidden as chadash as it has grown enough to be considered eatable. Upon
bringing the korban Omer that grain looses its issur and becomes permitted. Whereas
grain that had not grown a third but had taken root prior the bringing of the korban
Omer was not considered a food, therefore it did not attain the issur of chadash. After
the korban Omer was brought this grain too would be permitted to eat for it was now
not chadash. The korban accomplished different things for each of the grains. If a grain
was already a food and was already forbidden as chadash the korban would remove the
issur chadash. If a grain had only taken root the korban would render it yoshon (old)
without it having ever entered into the prohibition of chadash to begin with.
Therefore we can understand the p'sak of the Rama that grain in which you are uncertain of when
it grew is permitted by means of a sifek sifaika, because there are indeed two separate
s'faikos. One safek is did it grow prior to bringing the korban and become a food which
was prohibited as chadash which would receive the heter from the korban, or did it grow
after the korban was brought and therefore did not yet become mutar. The second safek
is that even if it grew after the korban was brought and did not receive a heter from the
korban nonetheless perhaps it took root before the korban was brought and therefore did
not require a heter because it was deemed old grain without ever becoming prohibited.
{R.F.}
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/06/2011 01:24:00 PM
taken root prior to the bringing of the korban that grain is permitted. Today that we do not
have a bais hamikdash and cannot bring the korban Omer the new grain is permitted after
the day the korban would have been brought; in Eretz Yisroel after the 16th day of Nissan,
and in Chutz L'aretz it is permitted after the 17th day of Nissan.
The Rama in Yorah Deah (293:3) cites the Tur in the name of the R"Ash that says that
if one has grain that he does not know when it grew it is permitted to eat because of a
s'fek s'faika (double safek). One safek is did it grow entirely before pessach or after. The
second safek is that even if it grew after pessach perhaps it took root before pessach and
would thus be permitted.
Many Achronim (R' Akiva Aiger, the Nisivos, the Kraisi Uplaisi) were bothered by
this p'sak. They asked that this is not two separate sifakos rather it is one safek; did
the korban Omer pass and permit this grain. What does it matter if it grew entirely
before pessach or only took root by then, in both scenarios the korban permits the grain.
Therefore it should not be regarded as a s'fek s'faika, and should be forbidden.
The Uruch Hashulchan in Yorah Deah 293:16 suggests the following explanation for the
p'sak of the Rama. He says that if there is a nafka mina (halachic difference) between the
two sifakos then we can still apply the rule of s'fek s'faika even if they are essentially one
safek. He writes that there is a nafka mina between whether the grain grew last year or
if it only took root before the korban Omer. If it grew last year we would not be able to
use it in the korban Omer, whereas if it grew this year and took root before the korban we
would be able to use it for the korban. He adds although this difference is not applicable
nowadays nonetheless it is sufficient to separate the two s'faikos and apply a s'fek s'faika.
The sefer Harirai Kedem suggests that indeed there is a difference whether the grain
grew before the korban Omer was brought and if the grain had only taken root before
the korban was brought. Grain that grew at least a third before the korban was brought
becomes forbidden as chadash as it has grown enough to be considered eatable. Upon
bringing the korban Omer that grain looses its issur and becomes permitted. Whereas
grain that had not grown a third but had taken root prior the bringing of the korban
Omer was not considered a food, therefore it did not attain the issur of chadash. After
the korban Omer was brought this grain too would be permitted to eat for it was now
not chadash. The korban accomplished different things for each of the grains. If a grain
was already a food and was already forbidden as chadash the korban would remove the
issur chadash. If a grain had only taken root the korban would render it yoshon (old)
without it having ever entered into the prohibition of chadash to begin with.
Therefore we can understand the p'sak of the Rama that grain in which you are uncertain of when
it grew is permitted by means of a sifek sifaika, because there are indeed two separate
s'faikos. One safek is did it grow prior to bringing the korban and become a food which
was prohibited as chadash which would receive the heter from the korban, or did it grow
after the korban was brought and therefore did not yet become mutar. The second safek
is that even if it grew after the korban was brought and did not receive a heter from the
korban nonetheless perhaps it took root before the korban was brought and therefore did
not require a heter because it was deemed old grain without ever becoming prohibited.
{R.F.}
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/06/2011 01:24:00 PM
[KollelH blog] Emor
Parshas Emor begins warning a Kohein from becoming Tam'ei by attending a burial, except for that of his own family members. It is well known that there is a general exclusion from this rule; a meis mitzvah - a corpse that has no one to take care of it. It is generally understood that the meis mitzvah 'variance' is due to the great importance of kavod habri'os - the care and concern for the respect of G-D's creations. I would like to share another aspect of the allowance for the Kohein to become tam'ei for a meis mitzvah.
One of the expressions that the Torah uses for the prohibition of tum'ah is לא יטמא בעל בעמיו להחלו - The commentators offer different translations for this difficult pasuk. The following is a qoute from Artscroll, based on Rashi. "A husband among his people shall not contaminate himself to one who desecrates him."
The Ramban explains the pasuk not in reference to a husband whose innappropriate wife desecrates him, (as Rashi learns,) but rather - "A master, among his people should not desecrate himself by attending a (typical) burial."
R' Yeruchom Levovitz za"tzal gleans from here a very important lesson. Although attending a funeral is an important deed - so much so, that in many instances it requires one to interrupt his Torah study for its procession, still, there is something that one may not give up or even temporarily disturb, for this. A 'master', who in some way is "a head above the rest", whether through a trait that was worked upon until acquired, or because of a G-D-given special character trait that sets him apart from the masses, may not allow himself to lose that uniqueness by socializing too much with the public. Just as a young prince would not be allowed to play in the streets with the commoners, as he may lose his sense of royalty, so too a kohein is witheld from some social obligations that even just temporarily oppose his status as a servant in the royal palace - the Beis Hamikdash.
Similarly, Maran Rav Shmuel Berenbaum za"tzal used to say, we find that doing a prohibited melachah on Shabbos is punishable with death, not only because of the severe prohibited act, but because the act is mechalel shabbos - it renders Shabbos as a simple, regular, mundane day of the week.
Lowering one's lofty spiritual status or giving up a positive trait may be alot more costly than many mitzvos demand of us to spend! Not only are we not required to give that up, but it may actually be prohibited!
This allows us to say that burying a meis mitzvah, which obviously does not involve the rest of common society, being that no one else is there to care for the meis, does not affect the kohein's status among men, rather it is a private act of great importance and not a self desecration at all.
We must be careful both with ourselves and our children, to ensure that with who and how we interact socially does cause a loss to the wonderful traits we've worked so hard on to instill!
Have a wonderful, special Shabbos!
{D.M.}
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/06/2011 03:05:00 AM
One of the expressions that the Torah uses for the prohibition of tum'ah is לא יטמא בעל בעמיו להחלו - The commentators offer different translations for this difficult pasuk. The following is a qoute from Artscroll, based on Rashi. "A husband among his people shall not contaminate himself to one who desecrates him."
The Ramban explains the pasuk not in reference to a husband whose innappropriate wife desecrates him, (as Rashi learns,) but rather - "A master, among his people should not desecrate himself by attending a (typical) burial."
R' Yeruchom Levovitz za"tzal gleans from here a very important lesson. Although attending a funeral is an important deed - so much so, that in many instances it requires one to interrupt his Torah study for its procession, still, there is something that one may not give up or even temporarily disturb, for this. A 'master', who in some way is "a head above the rest", whether through a trait that was worked upon until acquired, or because of a G-D-given special character trait that sets him apart from the masses, may not allow himself to lose that uniqueness by socializing too much with the public. Just as a young prince would not be allowed to play in the streets with the commoners, as he may lose his sense of royalty, so too a kohein is witheld from some social obligations that even just temporarily oppose his status as a servant in the royal palace - the Beis Hamikdash.
Similarly, Maran Rav Shmuel Berenbaum za"tzal used to say, we find that doing a prohibited melachah on Shabbos is punishable with death, not only because of the severe prohibited act, but because the act is mechalel shabbos - it renders Shabbos as a simple, regular, mundane day of the week.
Lowering one's lofty spiritual status or giving up a positive trait may be alot more costly than many mitzvos demand of us to spend! Not only are we not required to give that up, but it may actually be prohibited!
This allows us to say that burying a meis mitzvah, which obviously does not involve the rest of common society, being that no one else is there to care for the meis, does not affect the kohein's status among men, rather it is a private act of great importance and not a self desecration at all.
We must be careful both with ourselves and our children, to ensure that with who and how we interact socially does cause a loss to the wonderful traits we've worked so hard on to instill!
Have a wonderful, special Shabbos!
{D.M.}
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 5/06/2011 03:05:00 AM
Thursday, April 14, 2011
[KollelH blog] Achrei Mos - Kisuy HaDam
In parshas Acharai Mos (17:13) the Torah commands us in the mitzvah of kisoi hadam -covering the blood after a bird or a chaya (wild animal) is shechted. The mitzvah does not apply to beheimos (farm animals).
There is a machlokes as to the appropriate time to make the Brachah on the mitzvah of kisoi hadam. The R"Osh in the sixth perek of chullin (perek kisoi hadam) quotes the B'Hag that says the proper time to recite the brachah on the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is after the blood is already covered. Although generally we require that a brachah be recited prior to the performance of a mitzvah (over la-asiason), with regard to the mitzvah of kisoi hadam we are unable to recite the brachah prior to its performance. He explains that this is because the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is actually a part of the mitzvah of shechitah, it is the conclusion of the mitzvah. Therefore after the shechitah, prior to the covering of the blood one is in middle of a mitzvah, and one should not recite a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. The R"Osh agrees with the B'Hag that one should not make a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. However he argues with the B'Hag regarding the nature of the relationship that the mitzvos of shechitah and kisoi hadam share. The R"Osh says that the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is a separate mitzvah, and not a conclusion to the mitzvah of shechitah. Therefore one should recite the brachah of kisoi hadam prior to covering the blood in accordance with the general rule of over la-asiason.
The Bais Halevi (Tishuvos chelek 2 siman 14) points out an apparent contradiction in the opinion of the R"Osh. In regards to the proper time to recite the brachah on washing one's hands, there is a machlokes if the brachah should be recited prior to drying one's hands or after they are already dry. The Or Zaruah (siman 79) and the Hagaos Ashrei( Brachos 2 :11) are of the opinion that one should only recite the brachah after they have dried their hands. The R"Osh in P'sachim (1:10) and in Brachos (3:34) says that one should recite the brachah prior to drying one's hands. The opinion of the R"Osh by kisoi hadam was not to make a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. He only argued that one make the brachah of kisoi hadam between the shechitah and the covering because he said it was a separate mitzvah, and not in the middle of the mitzvah. Since the drying of one's hands is surely not a separate mitzvah from the mitzvah of washing one's hands, the time in between washing and drying is considered in middle of a mitzvah. In consistence with his opinion by kisoi hadam, the R"Osh should hold that one not recite the brachah until after he dry his hands!
The Bais Halevi answers that we must properly define what is considered "in the middle of a mitzvah". In order to be considered the middle of a mitzvah there must have already been completed a functioning initial part of the mitzvah. In the example of the mitzvah of shechitah and kisoi hadam, the shechitah is functioning and complete after the shechitah regardless of whether the kisoi hadam is ever completed. The shechitah works and one may eat the meat even if the blood is never covered. Therefore should kisoi hadam and shechitah be viewed as one mitzvah, we would consider the time after the shechitah to be in middle of a mitzvah. Whereas regarding the mitzvah of washing one's hands, the time after washing one's hands until they are dried is not considered the middle of the mitzvah. This is due to the fact that without drying one's hands the washing does not work. One may not eat until he has dried his hands. Therefore the time after one washes his hands before they are dried is not considered the middle of the mitzvah since there has not yet been a functioning part of the mitzvah completed. Although a certain aspect of the mitzvah has technically begun, we consider this point to still be the beginning of the mitzvah. Therefore the R"Osh is consistent in saying that one should make a brachah prior to drying his hands.
For questions and comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
--
Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 4/14/2011 11:39:00 PM
There is a machlokes as to the appropriate time to make the Brachah on the mitzvah of kisoi hadam. The R"Osh in the sixth perek of chullin (perek kisoi hadam) quotes the B'Hag that says the proper time to recite the brachah on the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is after the blood is already covered. Although generally we require that a brachah be recited prior to the performance of a mitzvah (over la-asiason), with regard to the mitzvah of kisoi hadam we are unable to recite the brachah prior to its performance. He explains that this is because the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is actually a part of the mitzvah of shechitah, it is the conclusion of the mitzvah. Therefore after the shechitah, prior to the covering of the blood one is in middle of a mitzvah, and one should not recite a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. The R"Osh agrees with the B'Hag that one should not make a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. However he argues with the B'Hag regarding the nature of the relationship that the mitzvos of shechitah and kisoi hadam share. The R"Osh says that the mitzvah of kisoi hadam is a separate mitzvah, and not a conclusion to the mitzvah of shechitah. Therefore one should recite the brachah of kisoi hadam prior to covering the blood in accordance with the general rule of over la-asiason.
The Bais Halevi (Tishuvos chelek 2 siman 14) points out an apparent contradiction in the opinion of the R"Osh. In regards to the proper time to recite the brachah on washing one's hands, there is a machlokes if the brachah should be recited prior to drying one's hands or after they are already dry. The Or Zaruah (siman 79) and the Hagaos Ashrei( Brachos 2 :11) are of the opinion that one should only recite the brachah after they have dried their hands. The R"Osh in P'sachim (1:10) and in Brachos (3:34) says that one should recite the brachah prior to drying one's hands. The opinion of the R"Osh by kisoi hadam was not to make a brachah in the middle of a mitzvah. He only argued that one make the brachah of kisoi hadam between the shechitah and the covering because he said it was a separate mitzvah, and not in the middle of the mitzvah. Since the drying of one's hands is surely not a separate mitzvah from the mitzvah of washing one's hands, the time in between washing and drying is considered in middle of a mitzvah. In consistence with his opinion by kisoi hadam, the R"Osh should hold that one not recite the brachah until after he dry his hands!
The Bais Halevi answers that we must properly define what is considered "in the middle of a mitzvah". In order to be considered the middle of a mitzvah there must have already been completed a functioning initial part of the mitzvah. In the example of the mitzvah of shechitah and kisoi hadam, the shechitah is functioning and complete after the shechitah regardless of whether the kisoi hadam is ever completed. The shechitah works and one may eat the meat even if the blood is never covered. Therefore should kisoi hadam and shechitah be viewed as one mitzvah, we would consider the time after the shechitah to be in middle of a mitzvah. Whereas regarding the mitzvah of washing one's hands, the time after washing one's hands until they are dried is not considered the middle of the mitzvah. This is due to the fact that without drying one's hands the washing does not work. One may not eat until he has dried his hands. Therefore the time after one washes his hands before they are dried is not considered the middle of the mitzvah since there has not yet been a functioning part of the mitzvah completed. Although a certain aspect of the mitzvah has technically begun, we consider this point to still be the beginning of the mitzvah. Therefore the R"Osh is consistent in saying that one should make a brachah prior to drying his hands.
For questions and comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 4/14/2011 11:39:00 PM
Friday, April 1, 2011
[KollelH blog] Tazria - Bris Milah
In the beginning of this week's parsha, the Torah writes that on the eighth day after a baby boy is born he should have his bris mila(circumcision). Several Achronim ask the following interesting question regarding this mitzvah. The Gimorah in kidushin (82 a) says that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, even though it was not yet given. Why then did Avraham Avinu not perform a bris mila on himself earlier? Why did he wait until he was commanded to do so at age ninety nine?
The Brisker Rav answers that Avraham kept the entire Torah even though it was not given. However certain mitzvos due to the lack of their existence were impossible for him to perform and therefore were not considered as if he didn't perform them. The mitzvah of Bris Mila is to remove the arlah (foreskin). Before Avraham was commanded to perform a Bris Mila there was no concept of arlah. Prior to the commandment to remove the arlah there was no distinction between the foreskin and the rest of the skin, since the foreskin was not yet considered arlah. Only once the Torah commanded him to remove the arlah, did the foreskin become arlah. Therefore prior to the commandment Avraham could not perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila.
With this understanding we can also answer another question. The passuk in parshas Lech Licha (17: 3) says that when Hasem spoke to Avraham regarding the mitzvah of Bris Mila, Avraham fell on his face. Rashi explains that he fell on his face because he was an arel (uncircumcised). We find that Hashem spoke to Avraham many times before this episode, why only now did Avraham fall on his face as a result of him being uncircumcised? According to the p'shat of the Brisker Rav that prior to his commandment to be circumcised the foreskin was not considered arlah, we can understand why Avraham never had the need to fall on his face while talking to Hashem until this time; because before this commandment he was not considered an arel.
Although the Brisker Rav said that prior to Avraham being commanded to perform a Bris Mila the arlah did not attain the status of arlah, the same does not apply to a baby boy before the eighth day. For even though he is not commanded to perform a Bris Mila until the eighth day, the fact that the Torah has already commanded us in the mitzvah of Bris Mila is sufficient to render the foreskin an arlah. We see this from the Gimorah in Yivamos (71 a) that asks whether a baby boy before the eighth day is considered an arel or not. If he is considered an arel one would not be permitted to rub oil made from Tirumah on him. The Gimorah entertains the possibility that a boy before the eighth day is considered an arel because he is commanded to perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila only at a later time, whereas Avraham was never commanded to perform the mitzvah at all.
Another example of a mitzvah that prior to its being commanded the concept did not exist is the mitzvah of Kiddushin. Although there was a form of marriage before the Torah was given it was a different status. With this the Brisker Rav explains how Yakkov Avinu was permitted to marry sisters. He explains that only under the new status of kiddushin marriage is it forbidden to marry sisters, whereas the marital status that existed prior to the giving of the Torah did not prohibit marrying sisters.
There is another answer to the question of why Avraham did not perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila prior to being commanded to do so, even though he kept the rest of the Torah. Bris Mila is a bris (covenant) between two parties. Before the other party agrees to a covenant there cannot be a covenant. Therefore prior to being commanded to perform a Bris Mila Avraham could not do so on his own for it would not be a bris (covenant).
For questions or comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 4/01/2011 05:47:00 PM
The Brisker Rav answers that Avraham kept the entire Torah even though it was not given. However certain mitzvos due to the lack of their existence were impossible for him to perform and therefore were not considered as if he didn't perform them. The mitzvah of Bris Mila is to remove the arlah (foreskin). Before Avraham was commanded to perform a Bris Mila there was no concept of arlah. Prior to the commandment to remove the arlah there was no distinction between the foreskin and the rest of the skin, since the foreskin was not yet considered arlah. Only once the Torah commanded him to remove the arlah, did the foreskin become arlah. Therefore prior to the commandment Avraham could not perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila.
With this understanding we can also answer another question. The passuk in parshas Lech Licha (17: 3) says that when Hasem spoke to Avraham regarding the mitzvah of Bris Mila, Avraham fell on his face. Rashi explains that he fell on his face because he was an arel (uncircumcised). We find that Hashem spoke to Avraham many times before this episode, why only now did Avraham fall on his face as a result of him being uncircumcised? According to the p'shat of the Brisker Rav that prior to his commandment to be circumcised the foreskin was not considered arlah, we can understand why Avraham never had the need to fall on his face while talking to Hashem until this time; because before this commandment he was not considered an arel.
Although the Brisker Rav said that prior to Avraham being commanded to perform a Bris Mila the arlah did not attain the status of arlah, the same does not apply to a baby boy before the eighth day. For even though he is not commanded to perform a Bris Mila until the eighth day, the fact that the Torah has already commanded us in the mitzvah of Bris Mila is sufficient to render the foreskin an arlah. We see this from the Gimorah in Yivamos (71 a) that asks whether a baby boy before the eighth day is considered an arel or not. If he is considered an arel one would not be permitted to rub oil made from Tirumah on him. The Gimorah entertains the possibility that a boy before the eighth day is considered an arel because he is commanded to perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila only at a later time, whereas Avraham was never commanded to perform the mitzvah at all.
Another example of a mitzvah that prior to its being commanded the concept did not exist is the mitzvah of Kiddushin. Although there was a form of marriage before the Torah was given it was a different status. With this the Brisker Rav explains how Yakkov Avinu was permitted to marry sisters. He explains that only under the new status of kiddushin marriage is it forbidden to marry sisters, whereas the marital status that existed prior to the giving of the Torah did not prohibit marrying sisters.
There is another answer to the question of why Avraham did not perform the mitzvah of Bris Mila prior to being commanded to do so, even though he kept the rest of the Torah. Bris Mila is a bris (covenant) between two parties. Before the other party agrees to a covenant there cannot be a covenant. Therefore prior to being commanded to perform a Bris Mila Avraham could not do so on his own for it would not be a bris (covenant).
For questions or comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 4/01/2011 05:47:00 PM
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