[KollelH blog] Yom Kippor

Maftir Yonah and the Parshah of Arayos

There is a machlokes between the Mechaber and the Ramah concerning the berachos recited on the Yom Kippur haftarah by Minchah. The Mechaber says (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 622:2) that we take the Torah out and read the parshah of arayos and then read Maftir Yonah. He says that we recite the berachos of the haftarah before and after the haftarah. If Yom Kippur falls out on Shabbos, we mention Shabbos in the berachos. The Ramah argues that we do not recite the berachah of "al haTorah v'al ha'avodah" by Minchah.

The Vilna Gaon explains that this machlokes is based on a fundamental difference of opinion as to the nature of why we read the Torah and haftarah at Minchah on Yom Kippur. The Mechaber holds that the reason why we read a the Torah and haftarah at Minchah on Yom Kippur is because it is part of the service of Yom Kippur. This is similar to the fact that we read from the Torah on Shabbos by Minchah; . Therefore the Mechaber rules that the berachah of "al haTorah…" is recited, like it is recited on Shabbos. And if Yom Kippur falls out on Shabbos, we mention Shabbos in the berachah.

The Ramah's view is that the Torah reading at Minchah on Yom Kippur is unrelated to the kedushah of Yom Kippur; rather, we read the Torah and the haftarah because Yom Kippur is a fast day, and on all fast days we read the Torah and haftarah at Minchah. Even though on a general fast day the reading of the Torah is from the parshah of "Vayechal Moshe…" the specific reading may be changed. On a regular fast day we do not recite the berachah of "al haTorah"; therefore the Ramah rules that we should not recite that berachah on Yom Kippur.

A halachic ramification should result from this machlokes. Take this scenario, for example: A sick man who must eat on Yom Kippur, may he receive an aliyah by Minchah on Yom Kippur? If the essence of why we read the Torah by Minchah on Yom Kippur results from the kedushah of Yom Kippur, this sick man may receive an aliyah since he has not violated the kedushah of the day. But if the reason why we read the Torah is because Yom Kippur is a fast day and on fast days we read the Torah by Minchah, then he would not be able to receive an aliyah, as he is not currently fasting. As the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 566:6 rules: one who is not fasting may not receive an aliyah on a fast day.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in Teshuvos 24, rules that one who must eat for medical reasons may receive an aliyah at Shacharis on Yom Kippur. This is because the Torah reading at Shacharis definitely stems from the kedushas hayom. However, he says that he is unsure if he may receive one at Minchah, for perhaps that Torah reading results from the fact that it is a fast day.

Based on the Vilna Gaon's explanation, this matter should depend on the machlokes between the Ramah and the Mechaber. According to the Mechaber one should be able to receive an aliyah even if he is not fasting. According to the Ramah he should not be able to receive an aliyah.

The difference between whether the Torah reading results from the kedushas hayom or if it results from the fact that it is a fast day is a fundamental difference in the essence of the Torah reading. If it results from the kedushas hayom, it is a regular Torah reading that is essentially public study of Torah. If we read the Torah because it is a fast day, then the purpose of the reading is essentially to rebuke the congregation. The main rebuke is actually found in the haftarah, except that we cannot read a haftarah only without reading from the actual Torah first. This is the understanding behind the opinion in Megillah 22b that says that only one aliyah is required on a fast day, since the main purpose is to reach the rebuke found in the haftarah.

There are two different sources for why we read the parshah of the arayos at Minchah on Yom Kippur. Rashi, in Megillah 31a, says that it is because one who has committed the sins of arayos should do teshuvah. Similarly Tosafos there says that we read that parshah because women dress nicely on Yom Tov and thus we want to remind everyone of the possible aveiros about which they should be cautious.

Tosafos there also quotes a medrash that says that the reason that we read the parshah of the arayos is to remind Hashem that just as we are commanded not to commit any aveirah with arayos, so too Hashem should not be megaleh ervasom beavonesem (commit an act of arayos with Bnei Yisrael's sins).

The sefer, Harirai Kedem, suggests that these two different reasons regarding the reading of the parshah of arayos could be dependent on the machlokes mentioned above. According to the Mechaber the reading of the Torah at Minchah on Yom Kippur results from the kedushas hayom; therefore we read a portion that relates to the kedushas hayom (namely, as the medrash explained, that Hashem should not punish us for our sins). According to the Ramah's view that we read the Torah at that time, as we would on any fast day when the essence of the Torah reading is primarily to rebuke the congregation, the portion that we read should be of rebuke (namely, as Rashi and Tosafos explained, to remind people not to do aveiros – and to do teshuvah).


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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 9/21/2012 10:12:00 AM

[KollelH blog] 7/25/2012 12:19:00 PM

The Aveilus Of Tisha B'Av Week

One may not perform several actions during the week in which Tisha B'Av falls. This is referred to as shavua she'chal bo. For example, one may not take a haircut or wash his clothing (Ashkenazi Jews are forbidden in these actions prior to the week of Tisha B'Av in accordance with the ruling of the Ramah). The Mechaber (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 551: 4) writes that in a year when Tisha B'Av falls on Shabbos and is pushed off to Sunday (as it does this year) there is a machlokes as to whether there are any prohibitions during the week before Tisha B'Av. The Mechaber seemingly sides with the view that there are no halachos of shavua she'chal bo in such circumstances.

Many Achronim explain that the dispute is based on the understanding behind the establishment of the fast of Tisha B'Av. The Gemara in Ta'anis 29a says that the Beis HaMikdash was lit close to the end of the ninth day of Av and continued burning throughout the tenth day of Av. Reb Yochanan said, "Had I been in the generation when Tisha B'Av was established, I would have established it on the tenth day of the month since the majority of the Beis HaMikdash burnt on that day." The Gemara says that the Rabbanan who established the fast on the ninth day of the month did so because they felt that it was better to establish the fast day on the day of the troubles' onset.

Based on this, they explain that the first opinion holds that there is no shavua she'chal bo in a year when Tisha B'Av falls on Shabbos and is pushed off to Sunday because the Rabbanan only argued that, when possible, the fast should be established at the onset of the troubles. However, when it is not possible to fast on the ninth day of Av (i.e., when it falls out on Shabbos), they would agree with Reb Yochanan's view that the fast should take place when the majority of the Beis HaMikdash burnt – namely on the tenth day of Av. Based on this, the week that precedes Tisha B'Av is not the week when the fast falls out, since in a year like this year we fast on the tenth day of the month (Sunday) – which is the beginning of the following week.

The other opinion holds that the halachos of shavua she'chal bo do apply to the week prior to Tisha B'Av, even when it falls on Shabbos, because they opine that the Rabbanan hold that the fast should always be on the ninth day – even when one cannot fast on that day. The reason why we fast on Sunday is merely to make up for not being able to fast on Shabbos. However, the fast day is primarily on the ninth day. Hence all the halachos of shavua she'chal bo apply, since Tisha B'Av falls out during that week – namely on Shabbos.

This permits us to explain another machlokes, the one between the Mechaber and the Ramah (554:19) regarding whether one must keep aveilus betzina (hidden aveilus, i.e. marital relations) on Tisha B'Av that falls on Shabbos. The Mechaber says that one may have marital relations on the ninth day of Av when it falls out on Shabbos. The reason: The fast was primarily established to be on the tenth day, and the ninth day is not a fast day at all. Therefore, the Mechaber holds that one need not keep any aveilus betzina on the ninth day. But the Ramah argues that this is forbidden and that one must keep aveilus betzina since the Rabbanan established Tisha B'Av to always be on the ninth day of Av – even when one cannot fast.

There is one problem, however, with this suggestion. Why does the Mechaber say that, when Tisha B'Av falls on Shabbos and is pushed off to Sunday, there is a leniency regarding one making a bris milah? In siman 559:9, the Mechaber writes that one who makes a bris milah on a Sunday Tisha B'Av (that really fell on Shabbos) does not have to fast and may wash his body. In contrast, one must fast and may not wash his body if making a bris milah on the regularly scheduled day of Tisha B'Av. If we explain that the Mechaber is of the opinion that when Tisha B'Av falls out on Shabbos and is pushed off to Sunday (making Sunday the actual day of the fast, and thus Tisha B'Av didn't fall in the prior week), permitting one to have marital relations on Shabbos, why is there any leniency or discrepancy regarding the fast on Sunday?

The sefer, Harirai Kedem, suggests a different understanding behind the machlokes. He suggests that the machlokes as to whether aveilus betzina applies on Shabbos Tisha B'Av is dependent on a different point. The Ramah, who says that it applies, holds that Tisha B'Av is in essence always on the ninth day and therefore aveilus betzina applies. The Mechaber agrees to this, but holds that there can only be one day that aveilus of Tisha B'Av is observed. And since we cannot fully observe the aveilus on Shabbos, we observe it only on Sunday.

Both sides of the machlokes regarding whether there are halachos of shavua she'chal bo the week before Tisha B'Av agree that Tisha B'Av is essentially on Shabbos. However, the opinion that holds that there are no halachos of shavua she'chal bo believes that the halachos applying to the week of Tisha B'Av are connected to the aveilus of Tisha B'Av – similar to a prelude to the aveilus of Tisha B'Av. So even though the actual day of the fast is primarily on Shabbos, and since aveilus is not observed on Shabbos, the week that Shabbos falls out also does not have any halachos of aveilus.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/25/2012 12:19:00 PM

[KollelH blog] maasai

Preempting The Death Penalty

In this week's parshah the Torah writes about a prohibition on killing a murderer prior to his trial. As the pasuk says: "…v'lo yamus harotzeach ad amdo lifnei haeidah lamishpat -- … so that the murderer will not die until he stands before the assembly for judgment" (Bamidbar 35:12). The same rule applies to anyone who commits an aveirah that is punishable by death; no one is permitted to kill him prior to his trial in beis din, including the witnesses that warned him and witnessed the aveirah. The Sefer Hachinuch (mitzvah 409) writes that if one kills a transgressor prior to his trial, he is regarded as a murderer.

Anyone who performs any aveirah l'hachis (a transgression to spite Hashem, not because of temptation) is rendered a mummar l'kol haTorah. The Rush (Moed Katan 3:59) says that one who is warned by two witnesses that the action he is about to perform is prohibited and punishable by death and responds that he will commit the aveirah despite the warning, attains the status of a mummar l'hachis. The reason is this: one performing the aveirah because of temptation would not do so after being warned that his life is on the line. Rather, we can assume that he is acting to spite Hashem.
Reb Chaim Ozer Grodzensky (Achiezer 3:53) writes that he discussed the following question with his wife's grandfather, Reb Yisroel Salanter, the gaon ohr yisrael: the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 26b) says that one may kill a mummar l'hachis. (This is brought down in several places by the Rambam, including Rotzeach 4:10, and in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 425:5.) This is known as "moridin v'eino malin – throw him into a pit and do not save him." The view of both the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch is that if possible one should publicly kill the mummar with a sword. The Rush (Teshuvos 32:4) says that one should only kill via a gramma (indirectly), i.e., throw him into a pit and remove the ladder.
Question: How can the Torah say that we cannot kill a murderer or any transgressor until after his trial in beis din, despite the fact that he was warned in front of witnesses? After all, according to the Rush the transgressor has the status of a mummar l'hachis (since he is not acting out of temptation), thereby permitting anyone to kill him as per the halacha of moridin v'eino malin.
Reb Chaim Ozer suggested two answers, but believed that the question demands more analysis. His first suggestion is that the pasuk is teaching us that although one is permitted to kill the individual who sinned by means of moridin, the Torah nevertheless prohibited killing him in this case until after his trial in beis din. However, Reb Chaim Ozer rejects this answer for several reasons. One reason: Why does the Chinuch say that one who kills the sinner is regarded as a murderer? Since he could kill him from the halacha of moridin, he should not be considered a murderer. The Chazon Ish (Yoreh De'ah 2:17) maintains that the halacha of moridin only applies when the sinner cannot be tried in beis din due to technical problems, i.e., no witnesses. Therefore, in a case to be brought in beis din one may not apply the halacha of moridin.
The second solution is that the pasuk is referring to a scenario in which we know that the individual did teshuvah. Therefore he can no longer be killed under the halacha of moridin. However, teshuvah does not remove the death penalty from beis din. Hence, the Torah says that we should wait until he is found guilty at trial before killing him.
I would like to suggest that the question does not start .I was scared to say that I learned the Rush differently than Reb Chaim Ozer and Reb Yisroel Salanter. But, Baruch Hashem, I found afterwards that the Chazon Ish (Yoreh De'ah 2:12) learns the Rush as I did. I believe that the Rush is being taken out of context. The Rush is discussing the Mishnah that says that there is no aveilus for people who are killed by beis din. The Rush explains that this is because since they were warned that their life was on the line but nevertheless sinned, they are obviously not acting out of temptation; thus, they are comparable to a mummar l'hachis. I think that the Rush never meant to say that anyone who transgresses after being warned is a mummar l'hachis regarding the halacha of moridin; rather the Rush is saying that regarding aveilus we consider him a mummar, comparable to a mummar l'hachis – whereby aveilus does not apply.
With this understanding of the Rush the question does not start because the Rush never said that we could apply the halacha of moridin to one who sins after being warned with his life. Therefore it is clear why the Torah commanded us not to kill a sinner until after his day in court – since he cannot be killed before then. And one who does kill him prior to his day in court will be considered a murderer.
For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 7/19/2012 11:53:00 PM

One can easily possess wisdom, but the wisdom must possess him.