[KollelH blog] 1/18/2013 08:54:00 AM

When Did Makkas Bechoros Occur?

    Dedicated to the refuah sheleimah of Shlomo Eliezer ben Chaya Sarah Elka.

There is a contradiction in the pesukim as to when makkas bechoros occurred. The pasuk in this week's parshah says, "vayehi bachatzos halailah, v'Hashem hikah kol bechor b'eretz Mitzrayim… – and at chatzos of the night, Hashem hit every firstborn in the land of Mitzrayim…" (Shemos 12:29). This pasuk states that makkas bechoros occurred by night. The implication from the pasuk in Bamidbar 8:17 is that makkas bechoros occurred by day, for the pasuk says: "b'yom hakosi kol bechor… -- on the day that I hit all of the firstborn…"

Maseches Semachos begins by posing this contradiction, and offers the following solution: Reb Yochanan says that at chatzos of the night, Hashem delivered a lethal blow to all of the bechorim that would kill them; however, they did not actually die until the morning. Hashem made it that their souls remained in them until the morning, in order that the Bnei Yisrael could witness their death.

The Peirush Nachalas Yaakov (found on the bottom of Maseches Semachos) explains why the masechta begins with this medrash. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 39a says that a min (apikores) asked Rebbe Avahu the following question: Hashem is a kohen, as it says "veyikcho li terumah." When Hashem buried Moshe Rabbeinu, in what did He immerse himself? Rebbe Avahu answered that He immersed himself in fire. Tosafos there asks why the min did not inquire as to how Hashem was able to become tamei by burying Moshe Rabbeinu. Tosafos answers that this did not bother the min because he knew that we are considered children of Hashem and that a kohen is permitted to bury his children.

According to Tosafos, Hashem would not be able to be metamei by killing someone, since even a kohen may only become tamei by burying his children, not by killing them. The Haggadah states that Hashem himself performed makkas bechoros. How then did Hashem himself kill the bechorim of Mitzrayim?

It is this question that the Maseches Semachos wishes to address when it brings down this medrash. The beginning of Maseches Semachos discusses the halachos regarding when one is dying but is still alive (goseis). Therefore, it began with a medrash that proves to us that during such a state, a person is not considered dead and thus not yet metamei. Since Hashem only delivered the blow that would kill the bechorim, He was not metamei to the bechorim since they were not yet dead.

On a side note, Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt"l, is quoted as explaining the discrepancy between the berachah of "ga'al Yisrael" that we say after Shema of Shacharis and the same berachah that we say in Ma'ariv. In Shacharis we say "miMitzrayim g'altanu … kol bechoreihem haragta." The mention of redeeming us from Mitzrayim precedes the mention of killing the bechorim. In Ma'ariv we say "hamakeh b'evraso kol bechorei Mitzrayim vayotzei es amo Yisrael mitocham lecheirus olam." The mention of hitting the bechorim of Mitzrayim precedes that of our redemption from Mitzrayim. This is because, as Maseches Semachos stated that at chatzos of the night Hashem only delivered the blow that would eventually kill the bechorim, the bechorim did not actually die until the morning. So at night we mention the blow that was delivered to the bechorim before the redemption, which only took place the following morning. In Shacharis, which is recited in the morning, we mention the redemption from Mitzrayim before the death of the bechorim because the redemption preceded the actual death of the bechorim, which occurred during the day.

The Shivus Yaakov (1:17) asks the following question on the Maseches Semachos: Why did the Mishnah not simply answer the contradiction in the pasukim (whether makkas bechoros occurred at night or by day) by saying that if a bechor was born after chatzos, even in the morning, he would die as well? The Shivus Yaakov suggests that based on this question it is imperative that a bechor who was born after chatzos did not die. Based on this observation, he rules that if one has a son born to him on the night before Pesach – after chatzos – he does not have to fast for that bechor since  had he been a Mitzri in Mitzrayim, he would not have been killed. Therefore, his father, who would generally have to fast on Erev Pesach for his bechor who is under bar mitzvah age, does not have to fast for his son.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.


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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 1/18/2013 08:54:00 AM

If we feel we don't deserve, we'd enjoy all that's served.

[KollelH blog] 1/10/2013 08:57:00 AM

Must One Hear His Own Davening?

Dedicated to the refuah sheleimah of Shlomo Eliezer ben Chaya Sarah Elka.

After each of the makkos, Moshe Rabbeinu had to daven to Hashem to stop the makkah. After the makkah of frogs, the pasuk says "…vayitzak Moshe el Hashem al devar hatzefardi'im asher sam l'pharoh – and Moshe cried out to Hashem regarding the frogs that he inflicted on Pharaoh" (Shemos 8:8). This is the only makkah in which we find that the Torah uses the word "vayitzak [cried out]" in reference to how Moshe davened to Hashem. By the other makkos, the Torah uses the word "vayetar." The Sifsei Chachamim asks the question that he says was bothering many people. He asks why the Torah changes its wording by the makkah of the frogs to the word "vayitzak."

The Sifsei Chachamim answers that the frogs were croaking and making a lot of noise. The halacha (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 101:2) states that one who is davening must recite the words loud enough for him to hear what he is saying. Since the frogs were making loud noises, Moshe could not hear his own words. Therefore, he had to scream his tefillah in order to hear his own words.

The Netziv, in his sefer Hemek She'eilah (143:6), points out a contradiction between the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi. The Tosefta (Berachos 3:9) says that one should not say the words loud enough to hear them himself. The Yerushalmi (Berachos 2:4) says that optimally one must recite the words of davening loud enough to hear them himself. The Netziv suggests that there is no dispute between the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi. Rather, the Tosefta agrees that one must say the words loud enough to hear them himself. The Tosefta, however, is referring to a situation of there being a lot of noise and he cannot hear himself – if he speaks at the decibel in which he would hear himself if there was no noise around him. In this situation the Tosefta says that one should not scream louder in order to hear himself over the noise; rather, it is sufficient to say the words at a decibel whereby he would hear himself if it was not noisy.

Regarding davening Krias Shema alone, one is required to say the words louder when he is in a noisy place in order to actually hear the words that he is saying. But tefillah only requires one to say the words at a decibel that, in a quiet atmosphere, he would hear himself; one does not actually have to hear his own words.

The Netziv seemingly contradicts directly what the Sifsei Chachamim said, namely that in a noisy place one must recite the words of davening louder so he can actually hear what he is saying. The Netziv believes that the halacha in which one must hear what he is saying is not to be taken literally; rather, the halacha only requires that one recite the words at a certain decibel that could generally be heard – regardless of whether he can actually hear himself.

Reb Akiva Eiger (Teshuvos 1:30) discusses whether we can apply to different situations the halacha that writing is considered as if one said the words that he wrote (kesivah kedibur), such as Sefiras Ha'omer. If one were to write what the day's omer was, would he have fulfilled his obligation of counting the omer? Reb Akiva Eiger says that regarding mitzvos in which, optimally, one must hear what he is saying, we cannot apply the halacha of kesivah kedibur. This is because even if we consider as if he said the words that he wrote, he nevertheless did not hear them. Therefore we cannot say that he has fulfilled his obligation in an optimal manner.

Some Acharonim suggest that Reb Akiva Eiger's issue that the application of the halacha of kesivah kedibur does not meet the requirements of hearing that which was written is dependent on the abovementioned machlokes. If the requirement to hear what is being said is to be taken literally (that one must actually always hear himself), Reb Akiva Eiger's issue is indeed a valid one. However, if the halacha that one must hear what he is saying does not dictate that one must actually hear himself but rather it is a decibel level of speech that must always be met, perhaps we can also apply kesivah kedibur to situations requiring one to hear himself. This is because the reason for the halacha that one must hear what he is saying is that otherwise, the words are not considered spoken but is instead considered to be thoughts. Once the words are spoken at a decibel in which one could theoretically hear them, they are considered to be spoken words – even if no one actually heard them.

According to the opinion that holds kesivah kedibur, there is another manner in which words can be considered as spoken and not as mere thoughts – namely by writing them. Written words are considered as if they are spoken, even though no one actually heard them. Therefore, even regarding a situation where optimally one is required to hear what he is saying, one could apply the halacha of kesivah kedibur since the written words will now be considered spoken words and not thoughts.

I believe that Reb Akiva Eiger's issue would apply even if he held the opinion that the halacha that one must hear what he is saying is merely a means to render the words as if they were spoken. This is because even the opinion that one does not actually need to hear one's self nonetheless supports the belief that the words have to be spoken on some decibel that could theoretically be heard in a quiet place. Written words, however, can never be heard; thus we could not apply the concept of kesivah kedibur to a situation that requires one to hear himself

.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.


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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 1/10/2013 08:57:00 AM

[KollelH blog] 12/14/2012 01:16:00 PM

Why Are Women Exempt From Saying Hallel On Chanukah?

Note to readers: This article is dedicated to the refuah sheleimah of Shlomo Eliezer ben Chaya Sarah Elka.

There are two mitzvos that the rabbanan instituted for Chanukah, lighting candles and saying Hallel. The Gemara in Shabbos 23a says that women are obligated in the mitzvah of lighting candles because af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness – they too were involved in the miracle.

It is implicit from the Rambam, in Hilchos Chanukah 3:14, that women are exempt from the mitzvah of saying Hallel on Chanukah. Many Acharonim were bothered by a simple question: the Gemara in Shabbos 23a says that women are obligated in the mitzvah of lighting candles on Chanukah as a result of: af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness. Why then should they not be obligated in the mitzvah of Hallel? To make the question stronger, some Acharonim point to Tosafos in Sukkah 38a (d"h me) that says that women are obligated in the mitzvah of Hallel on Pesach because of the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness. Why then should they be exempt from the mitzvah of Hallel on Chanukah?

The sefer, Sdei Chemed, quotes from Reb Sholmo HaKohen from Vilna that in truth women are obligated in the mitzvah of Hallel on Chanukah – but are not obligated in saying the entire version that Chazal instituted. They can fulfill their obligation by reciting one short paragraph that mentions praise to Hashem for the miracles. This idea is similar to the opinion of the Rambam, who says that one is obligated min haTorah to daven once every day. However, one need not daven the Shemoneh Esrei to fulfill this obligation; rather one can simply make one bakashah to fulfill his obligation.

Not all, however, welcomed this answer for several reasons. First, we do not find that it is mentioned anywhere that women are obligated to say Hallel. The Rambam writes that they cannot be motzi a man in his obligation, and does not differentiate whether they had earlier said one line of Hallel. Second, the Beis Yosef writes that women should not recite a berachah on Hallel on Chanukah. If they are indeed obligated and they are saying the version that Chazal instituted, why should they not recite a berachah as they do on Pesach?

Tosafos in numerous places inquires why women are not obligated in several different mitzvos as a result of the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness. In Megillah 4a, for example, Tosafos asks why women are not obligated to eat matzah on Pesach as a result of the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness. So why does the Gemara need to find a drasha that obligates them? Also, Tosafos (Sukkah 108b) asks why women are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah when the pasuk in Vayikra 23:43 says that we have the mitzvah of sukkah as a result of Hashem's miracle of making sukkos for us in the desert. Thus, they should be obligated as a result of the same rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness.

Several Acharonim ask why women are not obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin. The pasuk in Shemos 13:9 says that we wear tefillin because Hashem took us out of Mitzrayim. Based on that, women should be obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin as a result of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness.

The Sefer Harirai Kedem quotes an amazing explanation from Reb Moshe Soloveitchik that answers all of these questions, including the original one regarding Hallel on Chanukah. He explains that there is a difference between when a mitzvah's essence is to publicize the miracle and when the reason why we are obligated is to remember a miracle. There are only three times when the Gemara says that women are obligated in mitzvos as a result of the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness: lighting candles on Chanukah, reading the Megillah on Purim, and drinking four cups of wine on Pesach. All three of these mitzvos' essence is to publicize the miracle associated with that holiday. The mitzvos of sukkah, matzah and tefillin are all connected to miracles; however, they are merely a remembrance of the miracles. The essence of these mitzvos is not to publicize the miracle (pirsumei nissa). The only time that the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness can obligate one in a mitzvah is when the essence of the mitzvah is to publicize the miracle. Since the essence of the mitzvos of sukkah, matzah and tefillin are not pirsumei nissa, the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness cannot obligate women in those mitzvos.

The mitzvah to recite Hallel that Chazal instituted regarding Chanukah was in fact a direct result of the miracle of Chanukah; however, its essence is not to publicize the miracle but rather to give thanks for the miracle. On the other hand, the mitzvah of lighting candles was instituted in order to publicize the miracle. Therefore we can apply the rule of af ha'eim hayu b'osah haness – thereby obligating women in the mitzvah of lighting candles but not in the mitzvah of saying Hallel on Chanukah.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.


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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 12/14/2012 01:16:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Chayei sarah

there is a well known "stirah" between Avraham telling the bnei ches "ger v'toshav", which Rashi explains he claimed rights to the land. & yet in lech l'cha - "vayehi riv", rashi says that LOT's shepherds believed they had rights but Avraham argued that for now (till the cna'ani are gone) it was not yet his to have any claim?

Maran answered 'ein kinyan L'akum b'eretz yisrael" (gittin 47a) to absolve mitzvos but "yesh kinyan" to dig up the land... Meaning that the monetary kinyan over the land & the spiritual kinyan is split.

Similarly, the invauable me'oras hamachpelah wasn't a mekach ta'us b/c Efron only had access & ownership to the material monetary value. (Zohar)

Therefore we can say the cna'anim only had monetary rights so long as they were there... In lech l'cha the dispute was just regarding money grazing in others' fields. That Avraham did not allow. But here the malbim (& others) point out thet Avraham specifically made a public spectacle & numerous announcements that he was purchasing the land for kevurah - this was a spiritual endeavor - both on a personal level & as a lesson for mankind about the afterlife & appropriate regard for the body after the neshamah departs. Regarding this an akum does not own eretz yisrael, & Avraham had a claim.

We see that in one item it is possible to have a completely divided ownership, between the material & the spiritual.

In the aftermath of Sandy the mashgiach shlitah asked me with a tone of critique "nu & what was with our na'anu'im?" - of course Sandy was not a punishment for a lack of proper lulav shaking, but whtever sandy was for, we know that the shaking of lulav should protect against destructive winds.... - so what was with them?
Surely we shook the the lulav as described in halacha, but perhaps it was just the material shaking without "RUACH".

Perhaps we can try to instill positive "ruach" into our mitzvos & even more specifically - we can surely add a good dose of ruach to thanking Hashem in modim anachnu, that we've been spared the brunt of the storm.

May the strong infuence of positive Ruach into all of our deeds prevent any more Ruchos Ra'os from coming upon the world.

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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 11/12/2012 01:35:00 AM